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1. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this calculation is to estimate the probability of misloading a commercial spent 
nuclear fuel waste package with a fuel assembly(s) that has a reactivity (i.e., enrichment and/or 
burnup) outside the waste package design.  The waste package designs are based on the expected 
commercial spent nuclear fuel assemblies and previous analyses (Macheret, P. 2001, Section 4.1 
and Table 1).  For this calculation, a misloaded waste package is defined as a waste package that 
has a fuel assembly(s) loaded into it with an enrichment and/or burnup outside the waste package 
design.  An example of this type of misload is a fuel assembly designated for the 21-PWR 
Control Rod waste package being incorrectly loaded into a 21-PWR Absorber Plate waste 
package.  This constitutes a misloaded 21-PWR Absorber Plate waste package, because the 
reactivity (i.e., enrichment and/or burnup) of a 21-PWR Control Rod waste package fuel 
assembly is outside the design of a 21-PWR Absorber Plate waste package.  These types of 
misloads (i.e., fuel assembly with enrichment and/or burnup outside waste package design) are 
the only types that are evaluated in this calculation.  This calculation utilizes information from 
Frequency of SNF Misload for Uncanistered Fuel Waste Package (CRWMS M&O 1998) as the 
starting point. 
 
The scope of this calculation is limited to the information available.  The information is based on 
the whole population of fuel assemblies and the whole population of waste packages, because 
there is no information about the arrival of the waste stream at this time.  The scope of this 
calculation deviates from that specified in Technical Work Plan for: Risk and Criticality 
Department (BSC 2002a, Section 2.1.30) in that only waste package misload is evaluated.  The 
remaining issues identified (i.e., flooding and geometry reconfiguration) will be addressed 
elsewhere. 
 
The intended use of the calculation is to provide information and inputs to the Preclosure Safety 
Analysis Department.  Before using the results of this calculation, the reader is cautioned to 
verify that the assumptions made in this calculation regarding the waste stream, the loading 
process, and the staging of the spent nuclear fuel assemblies are applicable. 
 
2. QUALITY ASSURANCE 
The calculation is developed in accordance with the Technical Work Plan for: Risk and 
Criticality Department (BSC 2002a).  Additionally, the calculation is subject to the requirement 
of the Quality Assurance Requirements and Description (QARD), as shown in Section 8 of the 
Technical Work Plan for: Risk and Criticality Department (BSC 2002a). 
 
The calculation is governed by AP-3.12Q, Design Calculations and Analyses. 
 
The control of the electronic management of information was evaluated in accordance with 
AP-SV.1Q, Control of the Electronic Management of the Information, as specified in the 
Technical Work Plan for: Risk and Criticality Department (BSC 2002a), Section 8). 
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3. USE OF SOFTWARE 
The computer code System Analysis Programs for Hands-on Integrated Reliability Evaluations 
(SAPHIRE) V7.18 (BSC 2002b) is used to develop and quantify event trees in the calculation.  
SAPHIRE V7.18 is qualified software that was obtained from Software Configuration 
Management.  It is appropriate for use in the present calculation, and is used only within its 
range of validation, in accordance with AP-SI.1Q, Software Management.  SAPHIRE V7.18 
(software tracking number 10325-7.18-00) was installed on a Dell Optiplex GX260 running 
Microsoft Windows 2000 Professional (central processing unit 152369).  The inputs and output 
files are given in Attachment IV. 
 
Matchcad 2001i Professional, a commercial off-the-shelf software program is used in the 
preparation of this calculation.  This software program was installed on a Dell Optiplex GX260 
running Microsoft Windows 2000 Professional (central processing unit 152369).  A paper 
version of the Mathcad calculations performed in the calculation is given in Attachment III.  This 
attachment lists all the inputs and formulas used, as well as the corresponding outputs, so that the 
work can be reproduced and checked independently without recourse to the originator of the 
calculation.  Thus, the use of this software can be considered exempt from the requirements of 
AP-SI.1Q, Software Management. 
 
4. INPUTS 
4.1 DATA AND PARAMETERS 
4.1.1 Number of Waste Packages 
Table 1 lists the number of waste packages used in this calculation, which is from Repository/PA 
IED Typical Waste Package Components Assembly (2) (BSC 2003a, Table 11).  The number of 
commercial waste packages is based on the repository legal limit of 70,000 MTHM (metric tons 
heavy metal).  The number of expected waste packages are rounded up using the number of 
expected spent nuclear fuel assemblies for each waste package design (CRWMS M&O 2000, 
Table 10).  The number of fuel assemblies for each waste package type is also listed in Table 1.  
 
Table 1.  Total Number of Waste Packages and Fuel Assemblies for 70,000 MTHM 
Number Waste Package  Design 
Number of Waste 
Packagesa 
Number of Fuel 
Assemblies 
1 21-PWR Absorber Plate 4,299 90,262 
2 21-PWR Control Rod 95 1,992 
3 12-PWR Long 163 1,955 
4 44-BWR (boiling water reactor) Absorber Plate 2,831 124,532 
5 24-BWR Absorber Plate 84 2,013 
  Note:  aThe total number of waste packages has been rounded up to the nearest integer. 
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4.1.2 Human Error Probabilities 
Estimates of human error probabilities found in the Handbook of Human Reliability Analysis 
with Emphasis on Nuclear Power Plant Applications Final Report (Swain and Guttman 1983) 
are used in this calculation.  These probability estimates are accepted data.  This is based on the 
fact that these data are suggested for use by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) 
(NRC 1983, Sections 4.1 and 4.5.7) in order to evaluate the probability of occurrence of human 
errors, in the conduct of probabilistic risk assessments for nuclear power plants. 
 
The human error probabilities used are summarized in Table 2.  Notice that based on the 
Handbook of Human Reliability Analysis with Emphasis on Nuclear Power Plant Applications 
Final Report (Swain and Guttman 1983, pp. 2-18 and 2-19), the estimated human error 
probabilities are considered to follow a lognormal distribution.  The nominal probability is 
represented by the median.  The 5th percentile and the 95th percentile are calculated by dividing 
and multiplying, respectively, the median by an error factor, also shown in Table 2. 
 
Table 2.  Estimates of Human Error Probabilities 
Item # Description Nominal Probability 
Error 
Factor 
Source: 
Swain & Guttmann 1983
1 
Nominal human error probability for error of 
commission when no other human error can be 
found in the Tables 
3.00×10-3 5 
HEP - page G-1 
Error Factor - Item 7 of 
Table 20-20 
2 
Errors in selecting unannunciated displays –  
  from similar-appearing displays that are part of 
  well-delineated functional groups on a panel 
1.00×10-3 3 Item 3 of Table 20-9 
3 Checker fails to detect error by others –    Checking that involves active participation 1.00×10
-2 5 Item 4 of Table 20-22 
4 
Error of commission in reading and recording 
quantitative information 
  Recording Task:  Number of digits or “lettersa” to 
   be recorded  > 3 
1.00×10-3 
(per 
symbol) 
3 Item 9 of Table 20-10 
5 
Checker will fail to detect errors made by other 
  Checking routine tasks, checker using written 
  Material (checking written lists) 
1.00×10-1 5 Item 1 from Table 20-22 
 Note:  aIn this case, “letters” refer to those that convey no meaning.  Groups of letters such as MOV do convey 
meaning, and the recording human error probability is considered to be negligible. 
 
The parameters given above are appropriate for use in the calculation because they pertain to 
tasks performed in the nuclear industry, which adequately accounts for the highly-controlled 
conditions under which the loading activities are expected to be performed. 
 
4.1.3 Fuel Assembly Movements and Misloads 
The number of fuel assembly misloads due to selection, procedures, and other errors was 
determined in Waste Package Misload Probability (BSC 2001, Section 6).  The total number of 
misloads was 327 out of a total of 1,199,000 fuel assembly movements (BSC 2001, Section 6). 
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4.2 CRITERIA 
NRC requirements that pertain to the conduct of performance assessments are applicable to this 
evaluation. 10 CFR Part 63, in Section 63.102 (j), indicates that: 
 
“The features, events and processes considered in the performance assessment should 
represent a wide range of both beneficial and potentially adverse effects on performance 
[…].  Those features, events, and processes expected to materially affect compliance with 
Sec. 113(b) or be potentially adverse to performance are included, while events (event 
classes or scenario classes) that are very unlikely (less than one chance in 10,000 over 
10,000 years) can be excluded from the analysis.” 
 
The current inventory for the different waste package designs is listed in Table 1.  Using the 
information from Table 1 and the above requirement would indicate that any feature, event, or 
process that has a probability of occurrence of less than the 10-4 divided by the individual waste 
package design over 10,000 years (i.e., potential critical misload) can be excluded from the 
performance assessment.  Therefore, if the probability of occurrence for each waste package 
design is less than the probability listed in Table 3 can be excluded.  Thus, for the purposes of 
this calculation any misload that is estimated to occur with a probability less than the individual 
probability listed in Table 3 will be excluded from further consideration. 
 
Table 3.  Probability Criterion for Exclusion from Further Calculation 
Waste Package Design Probability Criterion 
21-PWR Absorber Plate 10-4/4,299 = 2.33×10-8 per WP 
21-PWR Control Rod 10-4/95 = 1.05×10-6 per WP 
12-PWR Long Absorber Plate 10-4/163 = 6.14×10-7 per WP 
44-BWR Absorber Plate 10-4/2,831 = 3.53×10-8 per WP 
24-BWR Thick Absorber Plate 10-4/84 = 1.19×10-6 per WP 
 
4.3 WASTE PACKAGE EXTRA INFORMATION 
The parameters discussed below are for information only about the current design of the waste 
packages.  The waste packages are designed to hold spent nuclear fuel from both PWRs and 
BWRs. 
 
Repository Design Project, RDP/PA IED Typical Waste Package Components Assembly 1 of 9 
(BSC 2003b, Table 1) provides information about the design dimensions for the different waste 
package, which are summarized in Table 4.   
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Table 4.  Physical Dimensions of Commercial Waste Package Designs 
No. Waste Package Design Outer Diameter In. (mm) 
Outer Length 
in. (mm) 
1 21-PWR Absorber Plate 64.7 (1,644) 203.3 (5,165) 
2 21-PWR Control Rod 64.7 (1,644) 203.3 (5,165) 
3 12-PWR Long 52.4 (1,330) 222.5 (5,651) 
4 44-BWR 65.9 (1,674) 203.3 (5,165) 
5 24-BWR 51.9 (1,318) 201 (5,105) 
 
The internal components are discussed in Yucca Mountain Science and Engineering Report 
(DOE 2001, Section 3.2.3).  The internal components for the different waste package designs are 
for information only and are listed in Table 5. 
 
Table 5.  Waste Package Design Component Materials 
Component Material 
Dual-layer design (all waste packages): 
  Inner structural shell 
  Outer corrosion-resistant barrier 
 
  Stainless Steel Type 316NG 
  Alloy 22 (SB 575 N06022) 
Waste package fill gas Helium 
Fuel Tubes for commercial spent nuclear fuel waste 
package basket design 
Carbon steel (SA 516 Grade 70) 
Neutron absorber interlocking plates for commercial spent 
nuclear fuel waste package (44-BWR, 24-BWR, and 
21-PWR) 
Neutronit A 978 (borated 316 stainless steel) 
Interlocking plates for 21-PWR Control Rod design Carbon steel (SA 516 Grade 70) 
Structural guides for commercial spent nuclear fuel waste 
package basket design 
Carbon steel (SA 516 Grade 70) 
Canister guide for 5-DHLW/DOE spent nuclear fuel 
designs 
Carbon steel (SA 516 Grade 70) 
Thermal shunts for commercial spent nuclear fuel waste 
package basket design 
Aluminum plate (SB-209 6061 T4) 
 
This section is to provide information about the different waste package designs and parameters.  
As can be seen from the Tables 4 and 5, the 21-PWR Control Rod and 21-PWR Absorber Plate 
waste packages are identical except for the basket material.  The 21-Control Rod waste package 
has its basket constructed of carbon steel, while the 21-PWR Absorber Plate waste package has 
its basket constructed of Neutronit (DOE 2001, Section 3.2.3). 
 
5. ASSUMPTIONS 
The assumptions below are used to calculate the probability that a spent nuclear fuel assembly is 
incorrectly misloaded into a waste package (e.g., a spent nuclear fuel assembly required to be 
loaded into a 21-PWR Control Rod waste package is incorrectly loaded into a 21-PWR Absorber 
Plate waste package).  
 
5.1 It is assumed that no BWR spent nuclear fuel assembly will be loaded into a PWR waste 
package and conversely, no PWR spent nuclear fuel assembly will loaded into a BWR 
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waste package.  The rationale for this assumption is based on the size difference between 
the fuel assemblies.  The PWR fuel assemblies are larger than the BWR fuel assemblies 
therefore, if a PWR fuel assembly is loaded into a BWR waste package it would be 
recognized and removed.  The same goes for attempting to load a BWR fuel assembly 
into a PWR waste package. 
 
5.2 It is assumed that no standard PWR fuel assembly (e.g., Babcock & Wilcox) will be 
misloaded into a 12-PWR Long Absorber Plate waste package.  It is also assumed that no 
PWR fuel assembly required to be loaded into a 12-PWR Long Absorber Plate waste 
package (e.g., South Texas or Combustion Engineering System 80) will be loaded into a 
21-PWR Absorber Plate or 21-PWR Control Rod waste package.  The rationale for this 
assumption is based on the size differences between the waste packages and fuel 
assemblies.  The South Texas or Combustion Engineering System 80 fuel assemblies are 
longer than the standard PWR fuel assembly (e.g., Babcok & Wilcox) and therefore, will 
be noticed if loaded into a 21-PWR Absorber Plate or 21-PWR Control Rod waste 
package since they will stick out the top.  The loading of a standard PWR fuel assembly 
into a 12-PWR Long Absorber Plate waste package would also be noticed since the fuel 
assembly would be some distance from the top of the waste package. 
 
5.3 It is assumed that the total number of each type of fuel assembly (i.e., BWR, standard 
PWR, and PWR long) is available for the operator to select.  This assumption is used to 
calculate the overall average probability of waste package misload because it allows for 
the selection from the whole population of fuel assemblies.  By allowing the selection 
from the whole population of fuel assemblies, this provides an average of the potential 
spikes and valleys that could occur over the waste package loading cycle.  This 
assumption is required since there is no information about the potential waste stream.  
The rationale for this assumption is it provides the best estimate at this time for the 
probability of waste package misload.  Once more information about the waste stream, 
PWR and BWR loading curves, and fuel assembly staging, a time line probability can be 
calculated.  However, this time line probability will have approximately the same average 
probability that is calculated in this report. 
 
5.4 It is assumed that only uncanistered fuel is loaded into the waste packages for this 
calculation.  All canistered fuel that is shipped to the repository will be loaded into a 
waste package upon receipt.  The rationale for this assumption is canistered fuel will be 
the last fuel products sent to the repository and since these fuel products are canistered 
the chance of misloading one is negligible. 
 
5.5 It is assumed that the shipping records for the fuel assemblies are correct.  The utilities 
document each fuel assembly and keep records about its initial status and life cycle 
through the reactor.  This information is assumed to be correct for this calculation.  The 
rationale for this assumption is based on the requirements of the utilities for proper 
bookkeeping since they are regulated by the NRC.  
 
5.6 It is assumed that fuel assemblies requiring control rods will be inserted once the fuel 
assembly has been loaded into the 21-PWR Control Rod waste package.  The rationale 
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for this assumption is based on a loading scheme that has not been defined.  The other 
potential loading scheme would have the control rods inserted into the fuel assembly 
upon receipt.  This loading scheme, which has the control rods inserted into the fuel 
assemblies upon receipt, will be evaluated as a sensitivity calculation (see Section 6.3.3). 
 
5.7 It is assumed that fuel assemblies loaded into the 21-PWR Control Rod waste package 
without having a control rod will be detected and removed.  The operator will notice this 
misload every time and the fuel assembly will be corrected every time.  The rationale for 
this assumption is based on the difference in appearance between fuel assemblies with 
control rods and without control rods.  The waste package will be loaded with fuel 
assemblies with control rods except one or at most two fuel assemblies without control 
rods and this difference will easily be spotted and corrected. 
 
5.8 It is assumed that the documentation used in the waste package loading process is correct.  
This assumption is used in order to define a starting point for the calculation.  That is the 
loading operators have documentation that states which waste package is to be loaded 
and what fuel assemblies are to be loaded into the waste package.  The rationale for this 
assumption is based on the process to generate the loading documentation is outside the 
scope of this calculation. 
 
6. ANALYSIS 
In order to calculate the probability of misloading a waste package (i.e., placing an incorrect fuel 
assembly(s) into the wrong waste package), the process of how fuel assemblies are received and 
loaded into the waste package must be understood.  The process of receipt and loading fuel 
assemblies into waste packages is described in Yucca Mountain Science and Engineering Report 
(DOE 2001, Section 2.2).   
 
The fuel assemblies are shipped to the repository in shipping casks via truck or train.  The 
shipping casks (either train or truck) are moved into the Carrier Bay to have their tie-downs 
removed and up-righted.  The shipping casks are then placed on a cask transfer cart and moved 
to the Assembly Transfer System for preparation and unloading.  Once in the Assembly Transfer 
System, the shipping cask is removed from the transfer cart and placed into a cask 
preparation/purge pit where its outer lid is removed.  The shipping cask is then moved to the 
Unloading Pool where the inner lid is removed and the cask is unloaded.  The fuel assemblies are 
removed from the shipping cask and placed into basket staging racks.  The shipping casks are 
then removed and sent back to be decontaminated and shipped offsite to receive more fuel 
assemblies. 
 
The fuel assemblies (up to nine per basket) contained in the baskets are removed from the 
staging racks and transferred to the assembly handling cell.  The baskets are placed into drying 
vessels where water will be removed.  After the fuel assemblies are completely dry, they are 
loaded into the waste package.  The waste package is then temporarily sealed and inerted prior to 
being moved to the Disposal Container Handling System for permanent closure.   
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For hot fuel assemblies (i.e., younger fuel assemblies), the Assembly Transfer System is 
designed to store these assemblies along with colder fuel assemblies (i.e., older fuel assemblies) 
for fuel assembly blending.  The fuel assemblies are stored in the Fuel Blending Inventory Pools 
in order to meet thermal loading limits.  The Fuel Blending Pools provide enough space to store 
sufficient inventory to provide flexibility in waste package loading. 
 
Prior to the fuel assembly loading, the waste package must be selected from the Empty DC 
Preparation Area.  The Line operator (Assembly Transfer System Line operator) requests an 
empty waste package from the DC operator (Empty Disposal Container Area operator), who 
places the appropriate waste package on a transfer cart and sends it to the Assembly Transfer 
System for loading. 
 
This process as noted above is documented in Yucca Mountain Science and Engineering Report 
(DOE 2001, Section 2.2) for Site Recommendation.  The process of unloading the shipping 
casks, staging of fuel assemblies, and loading the waste packages may change during License 
Application.  However, for this calculation this is the waste package loading process that will be 
used. 
 
To calculate the misload probability, an event tree will be used to express the process of 
selecting a waste package and fuel assembly.  The event tree will identify the potential processes 
and pathways that can lead to a misload (i.e., placing a fuel assembly with an enrichment and/or 
burnup outside the waste package design).  
 
6.1 MISLOAD EVENT TREE 
The misload event tree identifies the processes that can lead to a waste package being misloaded 
with the incorrect fuel assembly.  The event tree identifies the processes required to request a 
waste package, verify the waste package design, request a fuel assembly, and verify the correct 
fuel assembly is loaded.  The control rods for the fuel assemblies that are loaded into the 21-
PWR Control Rod waste package are inserted after the fuel assemblies have been loaded into the 
waste package (see Assumption 5.6).  These processes are top events on the misload event tree 
along with the fraction of waste package designs and fraction of fuel assemblies for each waste 
package design.  The misload event tree is created in SAPHIRE V7.18 in order to evaluate the 
probability of a misloaded waste package (i.e., a waste package loaded with a fuel assembly that 
has an enrichment and/or burnup outside its design).  SAPHIRE V7.18 will also be used to 
propagate the parameter uncertainty of the human error probabilities for each sequence that is 
designated as being misloaded.  For this calculation, a misloaded waste package is defined as a 
waste package that has a fuel assembly(s) loaded into it that is outside the waste package design.  
As an example, a fuel assembly designated for the 21-PWR Control Rod waste package that is 
incorrectly loaded into a 21-PWR Absorber Plate waste package represents a misloaded 21-PWR 
Absorber Plate waste package.   
 
There are two misload event trees, one for the PWR waste packages and one for the BWR waste 
packages.  The PWR event tree is shown in Figures I-1 through I-3 and the BWR event tree is 
shown in Figures II-1 through II-2.  Figure I-1 illustrates the processes required to load a 21-
PWR Absorber Plate waste package and identifies the processes where human errors can lead to 
a misloaded waste package.   
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The top events are common to both the PWR and BWR misload event trees.  The PWR event 
tree, shown in Figure I-1, represents the nominal process where fuel assemblies that have 
characteristics requiring control rods are inserted into them after being loaded into the waste 
package.  
 
6.1.1 Decision Event Tree Top Events 
WP-USAGE - This top event represents the waste package that is expected to store the PWR or 
BWR commercial spent nuclear fuel.  This top event is broken down into three branches for the 
PWR waste packages (i.e., 21-PWR Absorber Plate, 21-PWR Control Rod, and 12-PWR Long 
Absorber Plate) and two branches for the BWR waste packages (i.e., 44-BWR Absorber Plate 
and 24-BWR Absorber Plate).  The probability used for this top event is based on the fraction of 
waste packages listed in Table 7. 
 
WP-REQUEST - This top event represents the Assembly Transfer System Line operator (Line 
operator) requesting a waste package from the Disposal Container Area operator (DC operator).  
This top event is the first human action in the process of loading a waste package.  The Line 
operator requests a waste package based on the procedures (no information at this time) and the 
fuel assemblies that are ready to be loaded.  However, the Line operator requests the wrong 
waste package by making a slip/mistake (i.e., mentally requests the wrong waste package) after 
following the procedures.  This type of human error is called an error of commission - request.  
The median human error probability for this top event is Item 1 from Table 2.   
 
W-REQU-WP - This top event represents the waste package that was incorrectly requested by 
the Line operator.  The probability used for this top event is based on the fraction of the 
remaining waste package types that can be incorrectly requested.  The probability for this top 
event is based on the fraction of waste packages listed in Table 7. 
 
WP-SELECTED - This top event represents the waste package that was selected by the DC 
operator.  The failure of this top event is called an error of commission - selection.  This human 
error represents the operator following all of the procedures (no information at this time) and for 
some reason makes a mistake in selecting the correct waste package because of a distraction or 
some other mechanism.  The median human error probability used for this top event is Item 2 
from Table 2. 
 
WP-TYPE - This top event represents the waste package that was incorrectly selected by the DC 
operator.  The probability used for this top event is based on the fraction of the remaining waste 
package types that can be incorrectly selected.  The probability for this top event is based on the 
fraction of waste packages listed in Table 7.  This top event is also used as a mechanism for 
keeping track of which waste package design is currently being loaded by identifying the waste 
package type on the event tree. 
 
WP-VERIF - This top event represents the Line operator verifying if the waste package that was 
documented from following the procedures is the one that was selected and sent by the DC 
operator.  The median human error probability used for the Line operator failing to verify that 
the waste package sent by the DC operator is the correct waste package is Item 3 from Table 2. 
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FA-SELECT - This top event represents the different potential failures of the Line operator 
during the loading process of a waste package.  Both human errors (i.e., error of commission - 
request and selection) are developed under this top event.   
 
The first operator action is the Line operator can make a slip/mistake during the process of 
requesting a fuel assembly to be loaded into the waste package.  This slip/mistake causes the 
Line operator to request an incorrect fuel assembly (i.e., error of commission - request).  The 
median human error probability for this top event is Item 1 from Table 2.   
 
The second operator action modeled under this top event is the human error that can happen by 
the Line operator.  This human error performed by the Line operator is an error of commission - 
selection of an incorrect fuel assembly.  This human error has the Line operator selecting the 
wrong fuel assembly.  The median human error probability used for this top event is Item 2 from 
Table 2. 
 
FA-TYPE - This top event has been developed in order to handle two separate and different 
aspects of the fuel assembly loading and specification.  This top event ultimately represents the 
fuel assembly type that is being loaded into the waste package except there are different 
probabilities that is being represented by this top event.  Each of these representations will be 
discussed below. 
 
The first representation of this top event is based on the arrival of the fuel assemblies.  
The operator upon receipt of the fuel assemblies reviews the shipping records and records 
the fuel assembly information.  The operator at this time can make a mistake on writing 
down the information about the fuel assembly.  This is an error of commission in reading 
and recording information.  This mistake is important for criticality issues if a highly 
reactive fuel assembly is mislabeled as having a lower reactivity.  By making this error, 
the fuel assembly can be loaded into the wrong waste package.  As an example, the PWR 
misload of concern here is the loading of a highly reactive fuel assembly into a 21-PWR 
Absorber Plate waste package.  Under correct identification, this highly reactive fuel 
assembly would be designated as required for loading into a 21-PWR Control Rod waste 
package.  The median human error probability used for this error on incorrectly recording 
the fuel assembly information is Item 4 from Table 2. 
 
The second representation of this top event deals with the fraction of wrong fuel 
assemblies that can be loaded into the waste package either due to an error of commission 
- request or error of commission - select.  The probability for this representation takes on 
different values based on the type of human error from top event FA-SELECT.  The 
different values are based on the fraction of the fuel assemblies listed in Table 8. 
 
FA-VERIF - This top event represents two different checking processes based on the branching 
under top event, FA-TYPE.  Each operator verification process will be discussed.   
 
The first operator verification is a check of the fuel assembly documentation prior to 
staging.  The operator will check the written documentation to the shipping records as a 
back check prior to staging the fuel assembly.  The median human error probability used 
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for this verification is Item 5 from Table 2.  This is important because once the fuel 
assembly is staged with incorrect records there is no way of fixing this error and the fuel 
assembly will be loaded into the wrong waste package leading to a misloaded waste 
package. 
 
The second operator verification is based on verifying the correct fuel assembly has been 
loaded into the correct waste package.  This is the final check of the loaded waste 
package prior to sending it for final closure.  The median human error probability for the 
independent checker failing to verify the correct fuel assembly is loaded into the correct 
waste package based on the matching of records to the loaded waste package is Item 3 
from Table 2.   
 
6.1.2 Input Data into SAPHIRE 
The data listed in Section 4 requires some modifications prior to it being used as inputs into 
SAPHIRE for the quantification of the misload probability.  The first modification is converting 
the median human error probability to its mean probability.  The reason for this conversion is 
because SAPHIRE requires the mean probability for quantification and mean values are required 
to allow for the propagation of the human error uncertainty within SAPHIRE.  Equation 1 is used 
to calculate the mean probability from the median probability and error factor (Evans et. al., p. 
102). 
 


 ⋅⋅= 2
2
1exp50 σµ th      Eq. 1 
 
where: 
µ = mean human error probability 
50th = median human error probability 


=
645.1
)ln(EFσ  (Modarres 1993, p. 266) 
EF = error factor 
 
Equation 1 is used to determine the mean probabilities for the human errors that will be input 
into SAPHIRE for quantification of misloading a PWR and BWR waste package.  The error 
factors are also input into SAPHIRE since the human error probabilities are lognormal 
distributions.  The resultant mean values along with their error factors are listed in Table 6. 
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Table 6.  Mean Human Error Probabilities Input into SAPHIRE 
Item # 
(from Table 2) Description 
Nominal 
Probability 
Error  
Factor 
1 Error of commission - request  4.84×10-3 5 
2 Error of commission - selection 1.25×10-3 3 
3 Independent checker fails to detect wrong fuel assembly loaded into waste package 1.61×10
-2 5 
4 Error of commission - reading and recording informationa 1.25×10
-3 3 
5 
Independent checker fails to detect the incorrect 
information documented between what was written 
down versus fuel assembly shipping records 
1.61×10-1 5 
aThe information used for this human error probability is based on reading and recording information on a per 
symbol basis conveying no meaning (see Table 2 Item 4).  The representing operator action is performing the 
same operation (i.e., transcribing fuel assembly shipping records) where most if not all of the information conveys 
meaning.  Therefore, this human error probability as a whole (not trying to define or develop the number of 
symbols) is a good approximation for this operator action until a detailed human factor analysis can be performed. 
 
The different fractions of waste packages that can be selected based on the pathway through the 
misload event tree are listed in Table 7.  This information is based on the fraction of the wrongly 
requested and/or selected waste package.  These fractions are used as inputs into SAPHIRE for 
quantifying the misload probability.  These fractions are based on the total population listed in 
Table 1.  The fractions are calculated in the Mathcad spreadsheet listed in Attachment III.  The 
fractions are based on the number of specific waste packages divided by the total number of 
waste packages for that particular scenario. 
 
Table 7.  Fraction of Waste Packages Input into SAPHIRE 
Waste Package Combination Fraction of Waste Packages (see Attachment III) 
12-PWR Long Absorber Plate and 21-PWR Control Rod 
12-PWR Long Absorber Plate waste packages 6.32×10-1 
21-PWR Control Rod waste packages 3.68×10-1 
12-PWR Long Absorber Plate and 21-PWR Absorber Plate 
12-PWR Long Absorber Plate waste packages 3.70×10-2 
21-PWR Absorber Plate waste packages 9.63×10-1 
21-PWR Absorber Plate and 21-PWR Control Rod 
21-PWR Absorber Plate waste packages 9.78×10-1 
21-PWR Control Rod waste packages 2.20×10-2 
21-PWR Absorber Plate, 21-PWR Control Rod, 12-PWR Long Absorber Plate 
12-PWR Long Absorber Plate waste packages 3.60×10-2 
21-PWR Control Rod waste packages 2.10×10-2 
21-PWR Absorber Plate waste packages 9.43×10-1 
44-BWR Absorber Plate and 24-BWR Absorber Plate 
44-BWR Absorber Plate waste packages 9.71×10-1 
24-BWR Absorber Plate waste packages 2.90×10-1 
 
Table 8 lists the different fractions of fuel assemblies that can be selected based on the pathway 
through the misload event tree.  These fractions are based on the fraction of the wrongly 
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requested and/or selected fuel assembly.  These fractions are used as inputs into SAPHIRE for 
the quantification of the misload probability.  These fractions are based on the total population 
listed in Table 1.  The fractions are calculated in the Mathcad spreadsheet listed in Attachment 
III.  The fractions are based on the number of specific fuel assemblies divided by the total 
number of fuel assemblies for that particular scenario. 
 
Table 8.  Fraction of Fuel Assemblies Input into SAPHIRE 
Fuel Assembly Combination Fraction of Fuel Assemblies (see Attachment III) 
12-PWR Long Absorber Plate and 21-PWR Control Rod 
12-PWR Long Absorber Plate fuel assemblies 4.95×10-1 
21-PWR Control Rod fuel assemblies 5.05×10-1 
12-PWR Long Absorber Plate and 21-PWR Absorber Plate 
12-PWR Long Absorber Plate fuel assemblies 2.10×10-2 
21-PWR Absorber Plate fuel assemblies 9.79×10-1 
21-PWR Absorber Plate and 21-PWR Control Rod 
21-PWR Absorber Plate fuel assemblies 9.78×10-1 
21-PWR Control Rod fuel assemblies 2.20×10-2 
21-PWR Absorber Plate, 21-PWR Control Rod, 12-PWR Long Absorber Plate 
12-PWR Long Absorber Plate fuel assemblies 2.10×10-2 
21-PWR Control Rod fuel assemblies 2.10×10-2 
21-PWR Absorber Plate fuel assemblies 9.58×10-1 
44-BWR and 24-BWR 
44-BWR Absorber Plate fuel assemblies 9.84×10-1 
24-BWR Absorber Plate fuel assemblies 1.60×10-2 
 
6.1.3 Misload Event Tree End States 
The misload event tree for both PWR and BWR waste packages end in two different end states 
either “OK” or “POT-CRIT.”  The end states that end with “OK” represent those loaded waste 
packages that are within their design (i.e., loading a fuel assembly with the enrichment and/or 
burnup required for the waste package).  This end state is classified as: 1) loading of the correct 
fuel assembly into the correct waste package, 2) loading a fuel assembly into an incorrect waste 
package but is within its design (i.e., fuel assembly for a 44-BWR waste package loaded into a 
24-BWR waste package), or 3) the incorrect loading of a fuel assembly into a waste package that 
gets discovered and corrected.  The other end state classified as “POT-CRIT” denotes those fuel 
assemblies that have been loaded into a waste package that exceeds its design (i.e., loading a fuel 
assembly with an enrichment and/or burnup outside the waste package design).  Only the end 
states that end in “POT-CRIT” are quantified, since these end states are classified as a misloaded 
waste package. 
 
All of the sequences identified as misloaded waste packages in the PWR misload event tree are 
discussed in Table 9.  This table provides the information on the process of selecting a waste 
package, the process of selecting a fuel assembly, and the verification processes that leads to a 
misloaded waste package. 
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Table 9.  PWR Waste Package Misload Event Tree Sequences 
Sequences Description 
3C 
This sequence starts with loading the 21-PWR Absorber Plate (ABS) waste package.  The correct 
waste package was requested and selected.  The correct fuel assembly based on its associated 
records was selected.  However, during the receipt of the fuel assembly, the fuel assembly 
characteristics from the shipping records were incorrectly documented.  Therefore, the fuel assembly 
characteristics do not represent the information documented.  The independent verifier fails to 
discover this discrepancy.  Because the independent verifier failed to notice the discrepancy, an 
incorrectly documented fuel assembly was loaded into the waste package.  The fuel assembly 
characteristics are outside of the design of the waste package.  This sequence represents a 
misloaded waste package; therefore, the end state is denoted as “POT-CRIT.” 
10C 
This sequence starts with loading the 21-PWR ABS waste package.  The correct waste package was 
requested and selected.  An error of commission (EOC) - select was committed and the wrong fuel 
assembly was selected.  The fuel assembly is outside the design of the waste package.  The 
independent checker fails to discover this mistake and the fuel assembly gets loaded into the waste 
package.  Since the operator mistake was not recovered, the end state is denoted as “POT-CRIT. 
13C 
This sequence starts with loading the 21-PWR ABS waste package.  The Line operator requests the 
correct waste package; however, the DC operator selects (EOC - select) the wrong waste package.  
During the verification process, the operator fails to discover this mistake.  The loading process 
continues with the loading of the intended fuel assembly.  The intended fuel assembly is loaded into 
the 21-PWR Control Rod (CR) waste package, which has no criticality control mechanism.  A final 
verification fails to detect the fuel assemblies were loaded into the wrong waste package.  Since the 
mistake was not discovered, the end state is denoted as “POT-CRIT.” 
18C 
This sequence starts with loading the 21-PWR ABS waste package.  The Line operator requests the 
correct waste package; however, the DC operator selects (EOC - select) the wrong waste package 
(21-PWR CR).  During the verification process, the operator fails to discover this mistake.  An EOC - 
selection was committed and the fuel assembly for a 21-PWR ABS waste package was selected.  
This is an incorrect fuel assembly to be loaded into the 21-PWR CR waste package and the 
independent checker failed to discover this mistake.  Since the operator mistake was not recovered, 
the end state is denoted as “POT-CRIT.” 
20C 
This sequence starts with loading the 21-PWR ABS waste package.  The Line operator requests the 
correct waste package; however, the DC operator selects (EOC - select) the wrong waste package 
(21-PWR CR).  During the verification process, the operator fails to discover this mistake.  An EOC - 
selection was committed and the fuel assembly for a 21-PWR CR waste package was selected.  This 
is the correct fuel assembly to be loaded into the 21-PWR CR waste package, however, this is not the 
intended fuel assembly and the control rod is not inserted.  The independent checker fails to discover 
the mistake.  Since the operator mistake was not recovered, the end state is denoted as “POT-CRIT.” 
24C 
This sequence starts with loading the 21-PWR ABS waste package.  The Line operator requests the 
wrong waste package (EOC - request) and the DC operator selects this waste package (21-PWR 
CR).  During the verification process, the operator fails to discover this mistake.  The loading process 
continues with the loading of the intended fuel assembly.  The intended fuel assembly is loaded into 
the 21-PWR CR waste package, which has no criticality control mechanism.  A final verification fails 
to detect the fuel assemblies were loaded into the wrong waste package.  Since the mistake was not 
discovered, the end state is denoted as “POT-CRIT.” 
29C 
This sequence starts with loading the 21-PWR ABS waste package.  The Line operator requests the 
wrong waste package (EOC - request) and the DC operator selects this waste package (21-PWR 
CR).  During the verification process, the operator fails to discover this mistake.  An EOC - selection 
was committed and the fuel assembly for a 21-PWR ABS waste package was selected.  This is an 
incorrect fuel assembly to be loaded into the 21-PWR CR waste package and the independent 
checker failed to discover this mistake.  Since the operator mistake was not recovered, the end state 
is denoted as “POT-CRIT.” 
31C 
This sequence starts with loading the 21-PWR ABS waste package.  The Line operator requests the 
wrong waste package (EOC - request) and the DC operator selects this waste package (21-PWR 
CR).  During the verification process, the operator fails to discover this mistake.  An EOC - selection 
was committed and the fuel assembly for a 21-PWR CR waste package was selected.  This is the 
correct fuel assembly to be loaded into the 21-PWR CR waste package, however, this is not the 
intended fuel assembly and the control rod is not inserted.  The independent checker fails to discover 
the mistake.  Since the operator mistake was not recovered, the end state is denoted as “POT-CRIT.” 
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All of the sequences identified as misloaded waste packages in the BWR misload event tree are 
discussed in Table 10.  This table provides the information on the process of selecting a waste 
package, the process of selecting a fuel assembly, and the verification processes that leads to a 
misloaded waste package. 
 
Table 10.  BWR Waste Package Misload Sequences 
Sequences Description 
3C 
This sequence starts with loading the 44-BWR ABS waste package.  The correct waste package was 
requested and selected.  The correct fuel assembly based on its associated records was selected.  
However, during the receipt of the fuel assembly, the fuel assembly characteristics from the shipping 
records were incorrectly documented.  Therefore, the fuel assembly characteristics do not represent 
the information documented.  The independent verifier fails to discover this discrepancy.  Because the 
independent verifier failed to notice the discrepancy, an incorrectly documented fuel assembly was 
loaded into the waste package.  The fuel assembly characteristics are outside of the design of the 
waste package.  This sequence represents a critical misload; therefore, the end state is denoted as 
“POT-CRIT.” 
6C 
This sequence starts with loading the 44-BWR ABS waste package.  The correct waste package was 
requested and selected.  An EOC - request was committed and the wrong fuel assembly was 
requested.  The fuel assembly that requested was a fuel assembly outside of the design of the waste 
package and the independent checker fails to discover this mistake.  Since the operator failed to 
discover the mistake, the misload was not recovered.  This end state is denoted as “POT-CRIT.” 
10C 
This sequence starts with loading the 44-BWR ABS waste package.  The correct waste package was 
requested and selected.  An EOC - select was committed and the wrong fuel assembly was selected.  
The fuel assembly is outside the design of the waste package.  The independent checker fails to 
discover this mistake and the fuel assembly gets loaded into the waste package.  Since the operator 
mistake was not recovered, the end state is denoted as “POT-CRIT. 
 
6.2 CALCULATION OF MISLOAD PROBABILITY 
The human error probabilities listed in Table 6 and the fraction of waste packages and fraction of 
fuel assemblies listed in Tables 7 and 8, respectively are input into SAPHIRE for quantification.  
All of the sequences that lead to end states defined as “POT-CRIT” for both the PWR and BWR 
event trees are generated in SAPHIRE.  Only those sequences with the “POT-CRIT” end state 
are quantified in SAPHIRE by multiplying the top event probabilities together.  Once the 
sequence quantification process is performed, all of the sequences are summed together to get 
the overall misload probability.  The following subsections provide the information about the 
calculation of the PWR and BWR misload probability. 
 
6.2.1 PWR Misload Probability Calculation 
The sequences for the PWR event tree are generated to obtain all of the “POT-CRIT” end states.  
The probabilities for the “POT-CRIT” sequences are now ready to be evaluated.  The top event 
probabilities that lead to the “POT-CRIT” end states are multiplied together to obtain the overall 
sequence probability.  These sequence probabilities are then summed together to get the overall 
misload probability.  However, prior to the summation of all of the sequences that end in “POT-
CRIT” some of these sequences are modified.  This modification is based on the pathway that 
leads to the “POT-CRIT” end state. 
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Those sequences that have the operator selecting the wrong fuel assembly due to an error of 
commission - selection (FA-SELECT), are modified prior to being summed up with the 
remaining sequences.  These sequences are modified because the operator can make a selection 
error for any one of the fuel assemblies that are being loaded into the waste package.  For these 
sequences, the probability is calculated by using the Binomial distribution.  The Binomial 
distribution is used because each selection is independent from the previous selection (Modarres 
1993, p. 24).  The Binomial distribution is shown in Equation 2. 
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p is the sequence probability based on operator selecting the wrong fuel assembly 
n is the total number of fuel assemblies that specific waste package can hold 
x is the number of misloaded fuel assemblies 
 
To illustrate the use of Equation 2, for the 21-PWR Absorber Plate waste package, n is 21 
(number of fuel assemblies), and p is 3.96×10-7 (sequence 10 probability), and x is one fuel 
assembly.  The equation for one misloaded fuel assembly can be approximated by multiplying 
the probability, p, to the number of fuel assemblies, n.  Therefore, the sequence probability is 
approximated as (3.96×10-7)*(21) = 8.32×10-6 (see sequence 10C in Attachment I, Figure I-1).  
This process is applied to sequences 10C, 18C, 20C, 29C, and 31C on the event tree shown in 
Attachment I, Figure I-1 because each of these sequences are based the operator making an error 
of commission - selection.  The remaining sequences are calculated by just multiplying their top 
event probabilities together (i.e., 3C, 13C, and 24C), because these are waste package misload 
sequences that are based on other types of operator failures. 
 
To calculate the probability of two fuel assemblies being misloaded, Equation 2 is modified by 
setting x equal to two.  This represents the probability of exactly two fuel assemblies being 
misloaded into a waste package.  Using Equation 2 and the information from sequence 10C, the 
probability of misloading two fuel assemblies into a 21-PWR Absorber Plate waste package is 
3.29×10-11.  From the results of using Equation 2 to calculate the probability of two incorrect fuel 
assemblies being loaded into a 21-PWR Absorber Plate waste package, this probability is orders 
of magnitude lower than a single fuel assembly being misloaded.  As can be seen, this 
probability is approximately five orders of magnitude lower than the probability of misloading a 
single fuel assembly.  The probability is also below the criteria discussed in Section 4.2 and 
therefore, the probability of misloading two fuel assemblies will no longer be evaluated for PWR 
waste packages. 
 
After all of the sequence probabilities are calculated, an uncertainty analysis is performed within 
SAPHIRE.  The uncertainty analysis is performed to propagate the variability of the operator 
failure probabilities to obtain an overall uncertainty result.  The uncertainty analysis uses the 
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Monte Carlo sampling technique built into SAPHIRE.  The uncertainty analysis used 10,000 
samples and a seed value of 4321. 
 
The mean probability for each of the individual sequences along with their uncertainty values 
(i.e., 5th, 50th, and 95th percentiles) from the PWR waste package misload calculation is shown in 
Table 11. 
 
Table 11.  Individual Sequence Probability Results of Misloaded PWR Waste Packages 
Sequence 
Mean 
(per waste 
package) 
5th Percentile 
(per waste 
package) 
50th Percentile 
(per waste 
package) 
95th Percentile 
(per waste 
package) 
3C 3.52×10-6 2.72×10-7 1.90×10-6 1.19×10-5 
10C 8.35×10-6 5.82×10-7 4.20×10-6 2.98×10-5 
13C 2.94×10-7 1.07×10-9 3.47×10-8 1.04×10-6 
18C 1.24×10-8 1.45×10-11 7.62×10-10 3.84×10-8 
20C 2.72×10-10 3.19×10-13 1.67×10-11 8.42×10-10 
24C 1.10×10-6 2.69×10-9 1.01×10-7 3.93×10-6 
29C 3.04×10-8 4.82×10-11 2.17×10-9 9.85×10-8 
31C 6.66×10-10 1.06×10-12 4.75×10-11 2.16×10-9 
 
The overall results from the PWR waste package misload calculation are shown in Table 12.  
The overall results are based on performing an uncertainty analysis on the individual sequences 
listed in Table 11 that lead to a misloaded waste package.  The uncertainty analysis is basically 
the summation of the individual sequences using a Monte Carlo sampling process.  The process 
samples a probability from sequence 3C and adds it to the sampled probability from sequence 
10C and so forth until all the sampled sequence probabilities are summed together.  This process 
is performed 10,000 times.  The 10,000 samples are then used to determine the mean probability 
and the uncertainty parameters.  These results are those listed in Table 12.  The probability 
results listed in Table 12 are on a per PWR waste package basis. 
 
Table 12.  Overall Probability Results of Misloaded PWR Waste Package 
Results Probability  (per waste package) 
Mean 1.33×10-5 
5th 1.41×10-6 
50th 7.45×10-6 
95th 4.14×10-5 
 
The results for the PWR misload calculation are broken down into the probability of misloading 
a 21-PWR Absorber Plate waste package and a 21-PWR Control Rod waste package.  The 
process of calculating the individual waste package type misload probability is based on the 
sequence pathway.  Sequences 3C and 10C are classified as sequences that lead to a misloaded 
21-PWR Absorber Plate waste package.  Therefore, these sequences are summed together to 
represent the probability of misloading a 21-PWR Absorber Plate waste package.  The remaining 
sequences represent the probability of misloading a 21-PWR Control Rod waste package. 
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The sequences, which represent the misload of a 21-PWR Control Rod waste package, are based 
on two different processes.  The two processes are based on the sequence paths that lead to the 
misload end state of a 21-PWR Control Rod waste package.  Sequences 18C, 20C, 29C, and 31C 
represent the probability of misloading the waste package based on a per fuel assembly basis.  
This is based on the fuel assembly that is being loaded into the waste package is the wrong fuel 
assembly due to an operator error (i.e., error of commission - selection) and at the end of loading 
each fuel assembly there is a final verification check.  Because of this operator error (i.e., error of 
commission - selection), these sequences have the calculated probability multiplied by the 
number of spaces (i.e., twenty-one) available due to the fact that any one of the loaded fuel 
assemblies can be an incorrect fuel assembly.   
 
Sequences 13C and 24C also represent the probability of misloading the 21-PWR Control Rod 
waste package; however, all of the loaded fuel assemblies are wrong.  The reason all of the 
loaded fuel assemblies are wrong is based on the fact that the operator believes the waste 
package being loaded is a 21-PWR Absorber Plate.  This belief stems from the fact that both the 
21-PWR Absorber Plate and 21-PWR Control Rod waste packages are similar in design and size 
with the only difference being the basket material (see Section 4.3).  Therefore, all of the fuel 
assemblies that are loaded into the 21-PWR Control Rod waste package based on these 
sequences are those required to be in a 21-PWR Absorber Plate waste package.  However, for 
this analysis all of these sequences (i.e., 18C, 20C, 29C, 31C, 13C, and 24C) are summed 
together to represent the probability of misloading a 21-PWR Control Rod waste package. 
 
An uncertainty analysis is performed on the sequences that represent a misloaded 21-PWR 
Absorber Plate and 21-PWR Control Rod waste package.  The sequences are sampled 10,000 
times in order to determine the mean probability per waste package type along with their 
uncertainty parameters.  The results of the 10,000 Monte Carlo samples are shown in Table 13 
for both waste package types.  The 12-PWR Long waste package can not be misloaded because 
any fuel assembly that is not within its design will be identified and recovered (see Assumption 
5.2). 
 
Table 13.  Individual PWR Waste Package Results 
21-PWR Absorber Plate 21-PWR Control Rod 
Results Probability/WP Results Probability/WP 
Mean 1.18×10-5 Mean 1.43×10-6 
5th 1.36×10-6 5th 4.39×10-9 
50th 7.05×10-6 50th 1.59×10-7 
95th 3.68×10-5 95th 5.36×10-6 
 
Using the results in Table 13 and the total number of each waste package type, the probability of 
having at least one (i.e., one or more) waste package misloaded is calculated.  The total number 
of 21-PWR Absorber Plate waste packages is 4,299 and the total number of 21-PWR Control 
Rod wastes package is 95 (see Table 1).  The probability of at least one (i.e., one or more) 
misloaded waste package can be calculated using the Binomial distribution (Modarres 1993, p. 
24).  The Binomial distribution is: 
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p is the probability of misloaded waste package 
n is the number of waste packages (4,299 for 21-PWR Absorber Plate and 95 for 21-PWR 
Control Rod) 
x is the number of misloaded waste packages 
 
The mean probability per waste package listed in Table 13 is used to calculate the probability of 
at least one (i.e., one or more) waste package being misloaded (i.e., an incorrect fuel assembly(s) 
loaded into a waste package).  Not only is the mean probability used in the calculation, a Latin 
Hypercube Sampling process is developed to propagate the uncertainty of each waste package 
misload probability.  The principle of Latin Hypercube Sampling is provided in Modarres (1993, 
p. 244).  The Latin Hypercube Sampling process is developed in Mathcad and shown in 
Attachment III.  The uncertainty about the mean probability per waste package is fit to a 
lognormal distribution.  A lognormal distribution is chosen to fit the mean probability because 
the Handbook of Human Reliability Analysis with Emphasis on Nuclear Power Plant 
Applications Final Report (Swain and Guttman 1983, pp. A-2 and A-4) states that the product of 
lognormal probabilities are also lognormal.   
 
To obtain the lognormal parameter (i.e., error factor), the 95th and 5th probability are used.  The 
error factor and subsequent lognormal standard deviation are calculated using the following 
equations.  The error factor is calculated by using the fact that the 5th percentile (respectively the 
95th percentile) is obtained by dividing (respectively multiplying) the median, 50th, by the error 
factor (Swain and Guttman 1983, pp. 2-18 and 2-19). 
 
thth
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Equation 5 is developed by solving equation 4 for the error factor (EF). 
 
percentile
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th
5
95=      Eq. 5 
 
The error factor is converted to the lognormal standard deviation that is used in Equation 3 to 
propagate the uncertainty of the misload probability.  The lognormal standard deviation is 
calculated using Equation 6 (Modarres 1993, p. 266). 
 
645.1
)ln(
ln
EF=σ       Eq. 6 
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The misload mean probability and lognormal uncertainty parameter per 21-PWR Absorber Plate 
waste package are input into Equation 3 (Binomial distribution), which is sampled 10,000 times.  
The results of allowing the uncertainty for the probability of misloading a 21-PWR Absorber 
Plate waste package to propagate through Equation 3 are listed in Table 14.  Table 14 lists the 
mean probability, the 5th probability, and 95th probability from the Latin Hypercube Sampling 
process (see Attachment III).  
 
Table 14.  Probability of At Least One 21-PWR Absorber Plate Waste Package Misloaded 
Probabilities from LHS Process 
Mean 7.57×10-2 
5th 9.72×10-3 
50th 4.95×10-2 
95th 2.32×10-1 
 
The misload mean probability and lognormal uncertainty parameter per 21-PWR Control Rod 
waste package are input into Equation 3 (Binomial distribution), which is sampled 10,000 times.  
The results of allowing the uncertainty for the probability of misloading a 21-PWR Control Rod 
waste package to propagate through Equation 3are listed in Table 15.  Table 15 lists the mean 
probability, the 5th probability, and 95th probability from the Latin Hypercube Sampling process 
(see Attachment III). 
 
Table 15.  Probability of At Least One 21-PWR Control Rod Waste Package Misloaded 
Probabilities from LHS Process 
Mean 1.35×10-3 
5th 3.90×10-6 
50th 1.36×10-4 
95th 4.74×10-3 
 
6.2.2 BWR Misload Probability Calculation 
The sequences for the BWR event tree are generated to obtain all of the “POT-CRIT” end states.  
The probabilities for the “POT-CRIT” sequences are now ready to be evaluated.  The top event 
probabilities that lead to the “POT-CRIT” end states are multiplied together to obtain the overall 
sequence probability.  These sequence probabilities are then summed together to get the overall 
misload probability.  However, prior to the summation of all of the sequences that end in 
“POT-CRIT” some of these sequences are modified.  This modification is based on the pathway 
that leads to the “POT-CRIT” end state. 
 
Those sequences that have the operator selecting the wrong fuel assembly due to an error of 
commission - select (FA-SELECT), are modified prior to being summed up with the remaining 
sequences.  These sequences are modified because the operator can make a selection error for 
any one of the fuel assemblies that are being loaded into the waste package.  For these 
sequences, the probability is calculated by using the Binomial distribution. 
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To illustrate the use of Equation 2 (Binomial Distribution), for the 44-BWR Absorber Plate 
waste package, n is 44 (number of fuel assemblies), and p is 3.11×10-7 (sequence 10 probability), 
and x is one fuel assembly.  The equation for one misloaded fuel assembly can be approximated 
by multiplying the probability, p, to the number of fuel assemblies, n.  Therefore, the sequence 
probability is approximated as (3.11×10-7)*(44) = 1.37×10-5 (see sequence 10C in Attachment II, 
Figure II-1).  This process is applied to only sequence 10C on the event tree shown in 
Attachment II, Figure II-1 because this sequence deals with the operator making an error of 
commission - selection.  The remaining sequences are calculated by just multiplying their top 
event probabilities together (i.e., 3C and 6C), because these are waste package misload 
sequences that are based on other types of operator failures. 
 
To calculate the probability of two fuel assemblies being misloaded, Equation 2 is modified by 
setting x equal to two.  This represents the probability of exactly two fuel assemblies being 
misloaded into a waste package.  Using Equation 2 and the information from sequence 10C, the 
probability of misloading two fuel assemblies into a 44-BWR Absorber Plate waste package is 
9.15×10-11.  As can be seen, this probability is approximately five orders of magnitude lower 
than the probability of misloading a single fuel assembly.  The probability is also below the 
criteria discussed in Section 4.2 and therefore, the probability of misloading two fuel assemblies 
will no longer be evaluated for BWR waste packages. 
 
The sequence probabilities that end in “POT-CRIT” for the BWR misload event tree are 
quantified in the same manner as the PWR misload event tree.  Once the quantification process is 
complete, an uncertainty analysis is performed on the potential misload sequences using the 
Monte Carlo sampling technique built into SAPHIRE.  The results of the individual sequences 
from the BWR waste package misload calculation are shown in Table 16 along with the 
uncertainty results.  The uncertainty analysis is performed using 10,000 samples and a seed value 
of 4321. 
 
Table 16.  Individual Sequence Probability Results of Misloaded BWR Waste Packages 
Sequence 
Mean 
(per waste 
package) 
5th Percentile 
(per waste 
package) 
50th Percentile 
(per waste 
package) 
95th Percentile 
(per waste 
package) 
3C 2.86×10-6 2.13×10-7 1.51×10-6 1.02×10-5 
6C 1.17×10-6 4.50×10-8 4.48×10-7 4.54×10-6 
10C 1.37×10-5 9.56×10-7 6.91×10-6 4.90×10-5 
 
The overall results from the BWR waste package misload calculation are shown in Table 17.  
The overall results are based on performing an uncertainty analysis on the individual sequences 
listed in Table 16 that lead to a misloaded waste package.  The uncertainty analysis is basically 
the summation of the individual sequences using a Monte Carlo sampling process.  The process 
samples a probability from sequence 3C and adds it to the sampled probability from sequence 
6C, which is added to the sampled probability from sequence 10C.  This process is performed 
10,000 times.  The 10,000 samples are then used to determine the mean probability and the 
uncertainty parameters.  These results are those listed in Table 17.  The probability results listed 
in Table 17 are per 44-BWR Absorber Plate waste package basis, because only the 44-BWR 
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Absorber Plate waste package can be misloaded, since any BWR fuel assembly can be loaded 
into the 24-BWR Absorber Plate waste package and still be within its design. 
 
Table 17.  44-BWR Absorber Plate Waste Package Overall Results 
Results Probability/WP 
Mean 1.73×10-5 
5th 1.96×10-6 
50th 1.02×10-5 
95th 5.56×10-5 
 
Using the results in Table 17 and the total number of 44-BWR Absorber Plate waste packages, 
the probability of having at least one (i.e., one or more) 44-BWR Absorber Plate waste package 
misloaded can be calculated.  The total number of 44-BWR Absorber Plate waste packages is 
2,831.  The probability of one or more misloaded waste package is calculated using Equation 3.  
The results are shown in Table 18.  
 
The mean probability and lognormal uncertainty parameter (calculated using Equations 5 and 6) 
per 44-BWR Absorber Plate waste package are input into Equation 3 (Binomial distribution), 
which is sampled 10,000 times using Latin Hypercube Sampling.  The results of allowing the 
uncertainty for the probability of misloading a 44-BWR waste package to propagate through 
Equation 3 are listed in Table 18.  Table 18 lists the mean, 5th, 50th, and 95th probability from the 
Latin Hypercube Sampling process (see Attachment III).  
 
Table 18.  Probability of At Least One 44-BWR Absorber Plate Waste Package Misloaded 
Probabilities from LHS Process 
Mean 7.42×10-2 
5th 9.16×10-3 
50th 4.78×10-2 
95th 2.30×10-1 
 
6.3 SENSITIVITY CALCULATIONS 
Multiple sensitivity calculations are performed to calculate the probability of misloading a PWR 
or a BWR waste package.  The sensitivity calculations range from modification of the fuel 
assembly selection probability to process modifications.  Each sensitivity calculation is discussed 
individually. 
 
6.3.1 Modification to Operator Selection Error 
This sensitivity calculation modifies the human error probability for selecting the wrong fuel 
assembly.  The failure probability for selecting the wrong fuel assembly is determined from 
Waste Package Misload Probability (BSC 2001, Section 6).  The number of fuel assembly 
misloads due to selection, procedures, and other errors was 327 out of a total of 1,199,000 fuel 
assembly movements (see Section 4.1.3).  This misload information needs to be developed into a 
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probability distribution in order for it to be input into SAPHIRE.  This sensitivity calculation will 
use the same event tree shown in Figure I-1 through I-3 except the probability of selecting the 
wrong fuel assembly (top event FA-SELECT [error of commission - selection]) will use the 
probability calculated below. 
 
The probability distribution for selecting the wrong fuel assembly is obtained by using the 
Bayesian approach.  The Bayesian approach on determining parameters is discussed in detail in 
PRA Procedures Guide, A Guide to the Performance of Probabilistic Risk Assessments for 
Nuclear Power Plants (NRC 1983, Section 5.5.2) and Bayesian Reliability Analysis (Martz and 
Waller 1991, Section 7.2).  Bayesian estimation consists of updating the analyst’s belief about 
the parameter (embodied in the prior distribution) with information from the observations 
(quantified in a likelihood function), to obtain a posterior distribution.  This posterior distribution 
is what will be input into SAPHIRE in order to re-calculate the waste package misload 
probability for both PWR and BWR waste packages. 
 
The reason for using the Bayesian approach versus the classical approach is that a probability 
distribution on the parameter is estimated.  This probability distribution expresses the uncertainty 
about the parameter that can be reflected in the overall results. 
 
In order to utilize the Bayesian approach, a prior distribution needs to be obtained.  For this 
evaluation, a noninformative distribution is used as the prior distribution.  The reason for using 
the noninformative prior distribution is due to how it minimizes its impact on the data.  However, 
because of the large amount of data, limited impact from the prior distribution is expected on the 
posterior distribution.   
 
The beta distribution is chosen to fit the data.  The reason for selecting the beta distribution is 
based on its use when fitting demand failure data.  The beta distribution is a natural fit to 
demand-related data that follows a binomial sampling process.  The following equations are used 
to obtain the probability distribution using the Bayesian approach.  Equation 7 shows the prior 
distribution used in the Bayesian analysis, which is the noninformative prior distribution based 
on the binomial distribution (Martz and Waller 1991, Section 7.2.2). 
 
5.0)]1([)( −−= pppg       (0 ≤ p ≤ 1)                                  Eq. 7 
 
where: 
g(p) is the noninformative prior distribution 
p is probability parameter 
 
Applying Bayesian analysis to the prior distribution, the posterior distribution along with the 
posterior mean probability is determined using Equations 8 and 9.  Equation 8 is the posterior 
distribution that is input into SAPHIRE along with the mean misload probability calculated using 
Equation 9 (Martz and Waller 1991, Section 7.2.2). 
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where: 
g(p|x) is the posterior distribution of p given x 
p is the probability parameter 
n is the total number of fuel assembly movements (1,199,000) 
x is the total number of fuel assembly misloads (327) 
 
The mean is 
 
1
5.0
+
+=
n
xµ                                                                  Eq. 9 
 
where: 
µ is the mean probability 
n is the total number of fuel assembly movements 
x is the total number of fuel assembly misloads 
 
Based on the equations above, the mean fuel assembly misload probability that is input into 
SAPHIRE is 2.73×10-4.  The beta probability distribution input into SAPHIRE for uncertainty 
analysis is Beta(x+0.5,n+1).  This probability is input into the operator error that represents top 
event FA-SELECT (error of commission - selection). 
 
The results of the individual sequences using the new operator error probability from the PWR 
waste package misload calculation are shown in Table 19.  Table 19 shows the uncertainty 
results from the 10,000 Monte Carlo samples performed within SAPHIRE (seed value of 4321). 
 
Table 19.  Individual Sequence Probability Results of Misloaded PWR Waste Packages 
Sequence 
Mean 
(per waste 
package) 
5th Percentile 
(per waste 
package) 
50th Percentile 
(per waste 
package) 
95th Percentile 
(per waste 
package) 
3C 3.52×10-6 2.72×10-7 1.90×10-6 1.20×10-5 
10C 1.83×10-6 2.19×10-7 1.14×10-6 5.50×10-5 
13C 2.94×10-7 1.07×10-9 3.47×10-8 1.04×10-6 
18C 1.64×10-9 6.13×10-12 2.01×10-10 5.70×10-9 
20C 3.59×10-11 1.34×10-13 4.41×10-12 1.25×10-10 
24C 1.10×10-6 2.69×10-9 1.01×10-7 3.93×10-6 
29C 6.14×10-9 1.62×10-11 6.04×10-10 2.23×10-8 
31C 1.35×10-10 3.55×10-13 1.33×10-11 4.90×10-10 
 
The overall results for the PWR waste package misload calculation using the fuel assembly 
misload probability calculated above for error of commission - selection are shown in Table 20.  
The overall results are based on performing an uncertainty analysis on the individual sequences 
listed in Table 19.  The uncertainty analysis is basically the summation of the individual 
sequences using a Monte Carlo sampling process.  The process samples a probability from 
sequence 3C and adds it to the sampled probability from sequence 10C and so forth until all of 
the sampled sequence probabilities are summed together.  This process is performed 10,000 
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times.  The 10,000 samples are then used to determine the mean probability and the uncertainty 
parameters.  These results are listed Table 20 and are on a per PWR waste package basis.  
 
Table 20.  Overall Probability Results of Misloaded PWR Waste Package Using New Probability for Fuel 
Assembly Selection 
Results Probability/WP 
Mean 6.70×10-6 
5th 1.02×10-6 
50th 4.11×10-6 
95th 1.90×10-5 
 
The results for the PWR misload calculation are broken down into the probability of misloading 
a 21-PWR Absorber Plate waste package and a 21-PWR Control Rod waste package.  The 
process of calculating the individual waste package type misload probability is based on the 
sequence pathway.  Sequences 3C and 10C are classified as sequences that lead to a misloaded 
21-PWR Absorber Plate waste package.  The remaining sequences represent the probability of 
misloading a 21-PWR Control Rod waste package.  An uncertainty analysis is performed on the 
sequences that represent a misloaded 21-PWR Absorber Plate waste package and 21-PWR 
Control Rod waste package.  The sequences are sampled 10,000 times in order to determine the 
mean probability per waste package type along with their uncertainty parameters.  The results 
from the 10,000 Monte Carlo samples are listed in Table 21 for both waste package types.  The 
12-PWR Long waste package can not be misloaded because any fuel assembly that is not within 
its design will be recovered (see Assumption 5.2). 
 
Table 21.  Individual PWR Waste Package Results Using New Probability for Fuel Assembly Selection 
21-PWR Absorber Plate 21-PWR Control Rod 
Results Probability/WP Results Probability/WP 
Mean 5.37×10-6 Mean 1.35×10-6 
5th 9.86×0-7 5th 4.78×10-9 
50th 3.71×10-6 50th 1.57×10-7 
95th 1.50×10-5 95th 4.95×10-6 
 
The mean probability and lognormal uncertainty parameter per 21-PWR Absorber Plate waste 
package are input into Equation 3 (Binomial distribution), which is sampled 10,000 times.  The 
uncertainty analysis calculated the probability of at least one 21-PWR Absorber Plate waste 
package being misloaded.  The results from the propagation of the misload probability 
uncertainty for the 21-PWR Absorber Plate waste package are listed in Table 22.  Table 22 lists 
the mean, 5th, 50th, and 95th probability from the Latin Hypercube Sampling process (see 
Attachment III). 
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Table 22.  Probability of At Least One 21-PWR Absorber Plate Waste Package Misloaded 
Probabilities from LHS Process 
Mean 3.15×10-2 
5th 5.91×10-3 
50th 2.28×10-2 
95th 8.62×10-2 
 
The mean probability and lognormal uncertainty parameter per 21-PWR Control Rod waste 
package are input into Equation 3 (Binomial distribution), which is sampled 10,000 times.  The 
uncertainty analysis calculated the probability of at least one 21-PWR Control Rod waste 
package being misloaded.  The results from the propagation of the misload probability 
uncertainty for the 21-PWR Control Rod waste package are listed in Table 23.  Table 23 lists the 
mean, 5th, 50th, and 95th probability from the Latin Hypercube Sampling process (see Attachment 
III). 
 
Table 23.  Probability of At Least One 21-PWR Control Rod Waste Package Misloaded 
Probabilities from LHS Process 
Mean 1.20×10-3 
5th 3.87×10-6 
50th 1.28×10-4 
95th 4.26×10-3 
 
The new operator failure probability for top event FA-SELECT (error of commission - selection) 
is input into the BWR event tree (see Figure II-1).  The results of the individual sequences from 
the BWR waste package misload calculation are shown in Table 24.  Table 24 shows the 
uncertainty results from the 10,000 Monte Carlo samples performed within SAPHIRE (seed 
value of 4321). 
 
Table 24.  Individual Sequence Probability Results of Misloaded BWR Waste Packages 
Sequence 
Mean 
(per waste 
package) 
5th Percentile 
(per waste 
package) 
50th Percentile 
(per waste 
package) 
95th Percentile 
(per waste 
package) 
3C 2.86×10-6 2.13×10-7 1.51×10-6 1.02×10-5 
6C 1.17×10-6 4.50×10-8 4.48×10-7 4.54×10-6 
10C 3.01×10-6 3.59×10-7 1.87×10-6 9.04×10-6 
 
The overall results for the BWR waste package misload calculation using the fuel assembly 
misload probability calculated above for error of commission - selection are shown in Table 25.  
The overall results are based on performing an uncertainty analysis on the individual sequences 
listed in Table 24.  The uncertainty analysis is basically the summation of the individual 
sequences using a Monte Carlo sampling process.  The process samples a probability from 
sequence 3C and adds it to the sampled probability from sequence 6C, which is added to the 
sampled probability from sequence 10C.  This process is performed 10,000 times.  The 10,000 
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samples are then used to determine the mean probability and the uncertainty parameters.  These 
results are listed Table 25 and are per 44-BWR Absorber Plate waste package basis, because 
only the 44-BWR Absorber Plate waste package can be misloaded, since any BWR fuel 
assembly can be loaded into the 24-BWR Absorber Plate waste package and still be within its 
design. 
 
Table 25.  Overall Probability Results of Misloaded 44-BWR Absorber Plate Waste Package Using New 
Probability for Fuel Assembly Selection 
Results Probability/WP 
Mean 7.03×10-6 
5th 1.38×10-6 
50th 5.00×10-6 
95th 1.88×10-5 
 
The mean probability and lognormal uncertainty parameter per 44-BWR Absorber Plate waste 
package are input into Equation 3 (Binomial distribution), which is sampled 10,000 times.  The 
uncertainty analysis calculated the probability of at least one 44-BWR Absorber Plate waste 
package being misloaded.  The results from the propagation of the misload probability 
uncertainty for the 44-BWR Absorber Plate waste package are listed in Table 26.  Table 26 lists 
the mean, 5th, 50th, and 95th probability from the Latin Hypercube Sampling process (see 
Attachment III). 
 
Table 26.  Probability of At Least One 44-BWR Absorber Plate Waste Package Misloaded 
Probabilities from LHS Process 
Mean 2.66×10-2 
5th 5.38×10-3 
50th 1.97×10-2 
95th 7.09×10-2 
 
6.3.2 All PWR Waste Packages Contain Absorber Plate 
This sensitivity calculation looks at the possibility of a misload if all PWR waste packages 
contain absorber plates.  This would require design modifications to the 21-PWR Control Rod 
waste package.  These waste packages currently do not contain any criticality control built into 
their design.  The pretense for using these waste packages is that the fuel assemblies themselves 
would have control rods inserted for criticality control and thereby require no criticality control 
designed into the waste package.  This sensitivity calculation is performed to determine if there 
could be a misload of a PWR waste package if all the PWR waste packages contained absorber 
plates. 
 
The same event trees shown in Figure I-1 through I-3 are used for this calculation.  The 
difference is fewer sequences will lead to a misload.  The sequences that lead to a misload (i.e., 
those waste packages that have fuel assemblies with an enrichment and/or burnup outside its 
design) are listed and discussed in Table 27.  The sequence definitions are based on the same 
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loading process of adding control rods to the fuel assemblies requiring extra control once they 
are loaded into the waste package. 
 
Table 27.  PWR Waste Package Misload Event Tree Sequences 
Sequences Description 
3C 
This sequence starts with loading the 21-PWR ABS waste package.  The correct waste package was 
requested and selected.  The correct fuel assembly based on its associated records was selected.  
However, during the receipt of the fuel assembly, the fuel assembly characteristics from the shipping 
records were incorrectly documented.  Therefore, the fuel assembly characteristics do not represent 
the information documented.  The independent verifier fails to discover this discrepancy.  Because the 
independent verifier failed to notice the discrepancy, an incorrectly documented fuel assembly was 
loaded into the waste package.  The fuel assembly characteristics are outside of the design of the 
waste package.  This sequence represents a critical misload; therefore, the end state is denoted as 
“POT-CRIT.” 
10C 
This sequence starts with loading the 21-PWR ABS waste package.  The correct waste package was 
requested and selected.  An EOC - select was committed and the wrong fuel assembly was selected.  
The fuel assembly is outside the design of the waste package.  The independent checker fails to 
discover this mistake and the fuel assembly gets loaded into the waste package.  Since the operator 
mistake was not recovered, the end state is denoted as “POT-CRIT. 
20C 
This sequence starts with loading the 21-PWR ABS waste package.  The Line operator requests the 
correct waste package; however, the DC operator selects (EOC) the wrong waste package (21-PWR 
CR).  During the verification process, the operator fails to discover this mistake.  An EOC - selection 
was committed and the fuel assembly for a 21-PWR CR waste package was selected.  This is the 
correct fuel assembly to be loaded into the 21-PWR CR waste package, however, this is not the 
intended fuel assembly and the control rod is not inserted.  The independent checker fails to discover 
the mistake.  Since the operator mistake was not recovered, the end state is denoted as “POT-CRIT.” 
31C 
This sequence starts with loading the 21-PWR ABS waste package.  The Line operator requests the 
wrong waste package (EOC - request) and the DC operator selects this waste package (21-PWR 
CR).  During the verification process, the operator fails to discover this mistake.  An EOC - selection 
was committed and the fuel assembly for a 21-PWR CR waste package was selected.  This is the 
correct fuel assembly to be loaded into the 21-PWR CR waste package, however, this is not the 
intended fuel assembly and the control rod is not inserted.  The independent checker fails to discover 
the mistake.  Since the operator mistake was not recovered, the end state is denoted as “POT-CRIT.” 
 
Each of these sequences, which lead to a misload, is evaluated on the premise that all of the 
waste packages have absorber plates.  The same operator actions and probabilities for the 
nominal calculation are used for this sensitivity calculation.   
 
After all of the sequence probabilities are calculated, an uncertainty analysis is performed within 
SAPHIRE.  The uncertainty analysis is performed to propagate the variability of the operator 
failure probabilities to obtain an overall uncertainty result.  The uncertainty analysis uses the 
Monte Carlo sampling technique built into SAPHIRE.  The uncertainty analysis used 10,000 
samples and a seed value of 4321. 
 
The mean probability for each of the individual sequences along with their uncertainty values 
(i.e., 5th, 50th, and 95th percentiles) from the PWR waste package misload calculation is shown in 
Table 28. 
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Table 28.  Individual Sequence Probability Results of Misloaded PWR Waste Packages 
Sequence 
Mean 
(per waste 
package) 
5th Percentile 
(per waste 
package) 
50th Percentile 
(per waste 
package) 
95th Percentile 
(per waste 
package) 
3C 3.52×10-6 2.72×10-7 1.90×10-6 1.20×10-5 
10C 8.35×10-6 5.82×10-7 4.20×10-6 2.98×10-5 
20C 2.72×10-10 3.19×10-13 1.67×10-11 8.42×10-10 
31C 6.66×10-10 1.06×10-12 4.75×10-11 2.16×10-9 
 
The overall results for the PWR waste package misload calculation are shown in Table 29.  The 
overall results are based on performing an uncertainty analysis on the individual sequences listed 
in Table 28.  The uncertainty analysis is basically the summation of the individual sequences 
using a Monte Carlo sampling process.  The process samples a probability from sequence 3C and 
adds it to the sampled probability from sequence 10C and so forth until all of the sampled 
sequence probabilities are summed together.  This process is performed for the 10,000 samples.  
The 10,000 samples are then used to determine the mean probability and the uncertainty 
parameters.  These results are listed Table 29 and are on a per PWR waste package basis. 
 
Table 29.  Overall Probability Results of Misloaded PWR Waste Package 
Results Probability/WP 
Mean 1.18×10-5 
5th 1.36×10-6 
50th 7.05×10-6 
95th 3.68×10-5 
 
The results for the PWR misload calculation are broken down into the probability of misloading 
a 21-PWR Absorber Plate waste package and a 21-PWR Control Rod waste package.  The 
process of calculating the individual waste package type misload probability is based on the 
sequence pathway.  Sequences 3C and 10C are classified as sequences that lead to a misloaded 
21-PWR Absorber Plate waste package.  The remaining sequences represent the probability of 
misloading a 21-PWR Control Rod waste package.  An uncertainty analysis is performed on the 
sequences that represent a misloaded 21-PWR Absorber Plate waste package and 21-PWR 
Control Rod waste package.  The sequences are sampled 10,000 times in order to determine the 
mean probability per waste package type along with their uncertainty parameters.  The results 
from the 10,000 Monte Carlo samples are listed in Table 30 for both waste package types.  The 
12-PWR Long waste package can not be misloaded because any fuel assembly that is not within 
its design will be recovered (see Assumption 5.2). 
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Table 30.  Individual PWR Waste Package Results 
21-PWR Absorber Plate 21-PWR Control Rod 
Results Probability/WP Results Probability/WP 
Mean 1.18×10-5 Mean 9.39×10-10 
5th 1.36×10-6 5th 1.70×10-12 
50th 7.05×10-6 50th 7.22×10-11 
95th 3.68×10-5 95th 3.12×10-9 
 
The mean probability and lognormal uncertainty parameter per 21-PWR Absorber Plate waste 
package are input into Equation 3 (Binomial distribution), which is sampled 10,000 times.  The 
uncertainty analysis calculated the probability of at least one 21-PWR Absorber Plate waste 
package being misloaded.  The results from the propagation of the misload probability 
uncertainty for the 21-PWR Absorber Plate waste package are listed in Table 31.  Table 31 lists 
the mean, 5th, 50th, and 95th probability from the Latin Hypercube Sampling process (see 
Attachment III). 
 
Table 31.  Probability of At Least One 21-PWR Absorber Plate Waste Package Misloaded 
Probabilities from LHS Process 
Mean 7.57×10-2 
5th 9.72×10-3 
50th 4.95×10-2 
95th 2.32×10-1 
 
The mean probability and lognormal uncertainty parameter per 21-PWR Control Rod waste 
package are input into Equation 3 (Binomial distribution), which is sampled 10,000 times.  The 
uncertainty analysis calculated the probability of at least one 21-PWR Control Rod waste 
package being misloaded.  The results from the propagation of the misload probability 
uncertainty for the 21-PWR Control Rod waste package are listed in Table 32.  Table 32 lists the 
mean, 5th, 50th, and 95th probability from the Latin Hypercube Sampling process (see Attachment 
III). 
 
Table 32.  Probability of At Least One 21-PWR Control Rod Waste Package Misloaded 
Probabilities from LHS Process 
Mean 1.21×10-6 
5th 2.09×10-9 
50th 8.93×10-8 
95th 3.83×10-6 
 
6.3.3 Different PWR Waste Package Loading Scheme 
This sensitivity calculation looks at the process of loading control rods into all fuel assemblies 
requiring control rods for criticality control upon their receipt.  The only difference between this 
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sensitivity calculation and the nominal calculation is the fact that the control rods are inserted 
into fuel assemblies requiring extra criticality control upon their receipt.   
 
The same event tree structure shown in Figures I-1 through I-3 is used for this sensitivity 
calculation.  The only difference is the sequences that lead to a misload (i.e., those waste 
packages that have fuel assemblies with an enrichment and/or burnup outside its design).  The 
sequences that lead to a misload for this sensitivity calculation are listed in Table 33.  These 
sequences are derived based on the same philosophy used for the nominal case except the fuel 
assemblies already contain control rods.  Therefore, there are fewer misload opportunities. 
 
This loading scheme is looked at to see if there would be any difference between placing the 
control rods into fuel assemblies upon receipt or after loading them into the waste package.  The 
control rods are loaded into the fuel assemblies that are identified as requiring control rods for 
criticality control based on the documented records.  
 
Table 33.  PWR Waste Package Misload Event Tree Sequences 
Sequences Description 
3C 
This sequence starts with loading the 21-PWR ABS waste package.  The correct waste package was 
requested and selected.  The correct fuel assembly based on its associated records was selected.  
However, during the receipt of the fuel assembly, the fuel assembly characteristics from the shipping 
records were incorrectly documented.  Therefore, the fuel assembly characteristics do not represent 
the information documented.  The independent verifier fails to discover this discrepancy.  Because the 
independent verifier failed to notice the discrepancy, an incorrectly documented fuel assembly was 
loaded into the waste package.  The fuel assembly characteristics are outside of the design of the 
waste package.  This sequence represents a critical misload; therefore, the end state is denoted as 
“POT-CRIT.” 
13C 
This sequence starts with loading the 21-PWR ABS waste package.  The Line operator requests the 
correct waste package; however, the DC operator selects (EOC) the wrong waste package.  During 
the verification process, the operator fails to discover this mistake.  The loading process continues 
with the loading of the intended fuel assembly.  The intended fuel assembly is loaded into the 21-
PWR CR waste package, which has no criticality control mechanism.  A final verification fails to detect 
the fuel assemblies were loaded into the wrong waste package.  Since the mistake was not 
discovered, the end state is denoted as “POT-CRIT.” 
18C 
This sequence starts with loading the 21-PWR ABS waste package.  The Line operator requests the 
correct waste package; however, the DC operator selects (EOC) the wrong waste package (21-PWR 
CR).  During the verification process, the operator fails to discover this mistake.  An EOC - selection 
was committed and the fuel assembly for a 21-PWR ABS waste package was selected.  This is an 
incorrect fuel assembly to be loaded into the 21-PWR CR waste package and the independent 
checker failed to discover this mistake.  Since the operator mistake was not recovered, the end state 
is denoted as “POT-CRIT.” 
24C 
This sequence starts with loading the 21-PWR ABS waste package.  The Line operator requests the 
wrong waste package (EOC - request) and the DC operator selects this waste package (21-PWR 
CR).  During the verification process, the operator fails to discover this mistake.  The loading process 
continues with the loading of the intended fuel assembly.  The intended fuel assembly is loaded into 
the 21-PWR CR waste package, which has no criticality control mechanism.  A final verification fails 
to detect the fuel assemblies were loaded into the wrong waste package.  Since the mistake was not 
discovered, the end state is denoted as “POT-CRIT.” 
29C 
This sequence starts with loading the 21-PWR ABS waste package.  The Line operator requests the 
wrong waste package (EOC - request) and the DC operator selects this waste package (21-PWR 
CR).  During the verification process, the operator fails to discover this mistake.  An EOC - selection 
was committed and the fuel assembly for a 21-PWR ABS waste package was selected.  This is an 
incorrect fuel assembly to be loaded into the 21-PWR CR waste package and the independent 
checker failed to discover this mistake.  Since the operator mistake was not recovered, the end state 
is denoted as “POT-CRIT.” 
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Each of these sequences, which lead to a misload, is evaluated on the premise that control rods 
were inserted into the fuel assemblies upon arrival.  The same operator actions and probabilities 
for the nominal calculation are used for this sensitivity calculation. 
 
After all of the sequence probabilities are calculated, an uncertainty analysis is performed within 
SAPHIRE.  The uncertainty analysis is performed to propagate the variability of the operator 
failure probabilities to obtain the overall uncertainty results.  The uncertainty analysis uses the 
Monte Carlo sampling technique built into SAPHIRE.  The uncertainty analysis used 10,000 
samples and a seed value of 4321. 
 
The event tree sequences discussed above are evaluated using the same inputs that are used for 
the nominal calculation.  The mean probability for each of the individual sequences along with 
their uncertainty values (i.e., 5th, 50th, and 95th percentiles) from the PWR waste package misload 
calculation is shown in Table 34. 
 
Table 34.  Individual Sequence Probability Results of Misloaded PWR Waste Packages 
Sequence 
Mean 
(per waste 
package) 
5th Percentile 
(per waste 
package) 
50th Percentile 
(per waste 
package) 
95th Percentile 
(per waste 
package) 
3C 3.52×10-6 2.72×10-7 1.90×10-6 1.20×10-5 
13C 2.94×10-7 1.07×10-9 3.47×10-8 1.04×10-6 
18C 1.24×10-8 1.45×10-11 7.62×10-10 3.84×10-8 
24C 1.10×10-6 2.69×10-9 1.01×10-7 3.93×10-6 
29C 3.04×10-8 4.82×10-11 2.17×10-9 9.85×10-8 
 
The overall results for the PWR waste package misload calculation based on this sensitivity are 
shown in Table 35.  The overall results are based on performing an uncertainty analysis on the 
individual sequences listed in Table 34.  The uncertainty analysis is basically the summation of 
the individual sequences using a Monte Carlo sampling process.  The process samples a 
probability from sequence 3C and adds it to the sampled probability from sequence 13C and so 
forth until all of the sampled sequence probabilities are summed together.  This process is 
performed 10,000 times.  The 10,000 samples are then used to determine the mean probability 
and the uncertainty parameters.  These results are listed Table 35 and are on a per PWR waste 
package basis. 
 
Table 35.  PWR Waste Package Misload Overall Results Using Different Loading Scheme 
Results Probability/WP 
Mean 5.08×10-6 
5th 4.18×10-7 
50th 2.56×10-6 
95th 1.61×10-5 
 
The results for the PWR misload calculation are broken down into the probability of misloading 
a 21-PWR Absorber Plate waste package and a 21-PWR Control Rod waste package.  The 
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process of calculating the individual waste package type misload probability is based on the 
sequence pathway.  Sequence 3C is classified as the sequence that leads to a misloaded 21-PWR 
Absorber Plate waste package.  The remaining sequences represent the probability of misloading 
a 21-PWR Control Rod waste package.  An uncertainty analysis is performed on the sequences 
that represent a misloaded 21-PWR Absorber Plate waste package and 21-PWR Control Rod 
waste package.  The sequences are sampled 10,000 times in order to determine the mean 
probability per waste package type along with their uncertainty parameters.  The results from the 
10,000 Monte Carlo samples are listed in Table 36 for both waste package types.  The 12-PWR 
Long waste package can not be misloaded because any fuel assembly that is not within its design 
will be recovered (see Assumption 5.2). 
 
Table 36.  Individual PWR Waste Package Results Using Different Loading Scheme 
21-PWR Absorber Plate 21-PWR Control Rod 
Results Probability/WP Results Probability/WP 
Mean 3.52×10-6 Mean 1.43×10-6 
5th 2.72×10-7 5th 4.93×10-9 
50th 1.90×10-6 50th 1.59×10-7 
95th 1.20×10-5 95th 5.35×10-6 
 
The mean probability and lognormal uncertainty parameter per 21-PWR Absorber Plate waste 
package are input into Equation 3 (Binomial distribution), which is sampled 10,000 times.  The 
uncertainty analysis calculated the probability of at least one 21-PWR Absorber Plate waste 
package being misloaded.  The results from the propagation of the misload probability 
uncertainty for the 21-PWR Absorber Plate waste package are listed in Table 37.  Table 37 lists 
the mean, 5th, 50th, and 95th probability from the Latin Hypercube Sampling process (see 
Attachment III). 
 
Table 37.  Probability of At Least One 21-PWR Absorber Plate Waste Package Misloaded 
Probabilities from LHS Process 
Mean 2.79×10-2 
5th 2.28×10-3 
50th 1.50×10-2 
95th 9.57×10-2 
 
The mean probability and lognormal uncertainty parameter per 21-PWR Control Rod waste 
package are input into Equation 3 (Binomial distribution), which is sampled 10,000 times.  The 
uncertainty analysis calculated the probability of at least one 21-PWR Control Rod waste 
package being misloaded.  The results from the propagation of the misload probability 
uncertainty for the 21-PWR Control Rod waste package are listed in Table 38.  Table 38 lists the 
mean, 5th, 50th, and 95th probability from the Latin Hypercube Sampling process (see Attachment 
III). 
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Table 38.  Probability of At Least One 21-PWR Control Rod Waste Package Misloaded 
Probabilities from LHS Process 
Mean 1.26×10-3 
5th 4.13×10-6 
50th 1.36×10-4 
95th 4.47×10-3 
 
6.3.4 All PWR Waste Packages Contain Absorber Plate and Control Rods Pre-Inserted 
This final sensitivity calculation is similar to the calculation performed in Section 6.3.3.  The 
only difference is all 21-PWR waste packages contain absorber plates.  The same event tree 
structure as used for all of the calculations is used for this sensitivity calculation. 
 
By stepping through the process of selecting and loading a waste package, only one sequence 
leads to a misload (i.e., those waste packages that have fuel assemblies with an enrichment 
and/or burnup outside its design).  All of the previously analyzed sequences disappear because 
all 21-PWR waste packages contain some sort of criticality control built in and the fuel 
assemblies already contain control rods.  Since any fuel assembly requiring a control rod will 
already have one inserted and based on the assumption that a fuel assembly without a control rod 
would be recovered (see Assumption 5.7), all sequences that lead to a misload except one are 
eliminated. 
 
The only sequence remaining is sequence 3C.  This sequence is based on the operator 
documenting incorrect information about the fuel assembly.  The operator documents a fuel 
assembly requiring a control rod as having a lower reactivity and therefore does not have a 
control rod inserted.  This sequence leads to a misload of only a 21-PWR Absorber Plate waste 
package with a probability of 3.87×10-6.  The sequence uncertainty was propagated in SAPHIRE 
using 10,000 samples with a seed number of 4321 to obtain the results listed in Table 39. 
 
Table 39.  PWR Waste Package Overall Results Using Different Loading Scheme and All Waste 
Packages Contain Absorber Plates 
Results Probability/WP 
Mean 3.52×10-6 
5th 2.72×10-7 
50th 1.90×10-6 
95th 1.20×10-5 
 
The mean probability and lognormal uncertainty parameter per 21-PWR Absorber Plate waste 
package are input into Equation 3 (Binomial distribution), which is sampled 10,000 times.  The 
uncertainty analysis calculated the probability of at least one 21-PWR Absorber Plate waste 
package being misloaded.  The results from the propagation of the misload probability 
uncertainty for the 21-PWR Absorber Plate waste package are listed in Table 40.  Table 40 lists 
the mean, 5th, 50th, and 95th probability from the Latin Hypercube Sampling process (see 
Attachment III). 
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Table 40.  Probability of At Least One 21-PWR Absorber Plate Waste Package Misloaded 
Probabilities from LHS Process 
Mean 2.79×10-2 
5th 2.28×10-3 
50th 1.50×10-2 
95th 9.57×10-2 
 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
The probability of misloading a waste package with fuel assembly(s) outside their design (e.g., a 
spent nuclear fuel assembly required to be loaded into a 21-PWR Control Rod waste package is 
incorrectly loaded into a 21-PWR Absorber Plate waste package) is calculated.  This misload 
calculation is based on the assumption that during the loading process the whole population of 
waste packages and fuel assemblies is available for selection.  The calculation also made 
assumptions on how the waste packages and fuel assemblies are received, selected, and loaded 
since no formal procedures are available at the time of this calculation.  This misload calculation 
is performed for both the PWR waste packages and the BWR waste packages.   
 
The misload calculation first showed that the probability of misloading two or more fuel 
assemblies into a waste package due to operator selection error can be eliminated based on the 
final probability being below the criterion discussed in Section 4.2.  Therefore, only the 
misloading of a single fuel assembly outside the design of a waste package is evaluated in the 
event tree process.   
 
The misload calculation secondly showed that the probability of misloading at least one 21-PWR 
Absorber Plate, 21-PWR Control Rod, and 44-BWR Absorber Plate waste packages is above the 
criteria discussed in Section 4.2.  The misload calculation showed that both the 12-PWR Long 
and 24-BWR Absorber Plate waste packages can not be misloaded.  The 24-BWR Absorber 
Plate waste package can not be misloaded because any BWR fuel assembly can be loaded into it 
and still be within its design.  As for the 12-PWR Long waste package, all fuel assemblies 
outside its design will be discovered and recovered; therefore, no potential of being misloaded 
(see Assumption 5.2).  
 
The results of misloading the different waste package types (e.g., a fuel assembly required to be 
loaded into a 21-PWR Control Rod waste package is incorrectly loaded into a 21-PWR Absorber 
Plate waste package) are listed in Table 41.  The results listed in Table 41 are the mean 
probability on a per waste package type basis.  
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Table 41.  Final Individual Waste Package Results 
Waste Package Type Mean Probability/WP 
21-PWR Absorber Plate 1.18×10-5 
21-PWR Control Rod 1.43×10-6 
12-PWR Long 0.0 
44-BWR Absorber Plate 1.73×10-5 
24-BWR Absorber Plate 0.0 
 
Multiple sensitivity calculations were performed to calculate the probability of misloading a 
waste package with a fuel assembly outside its design.  The different sensitivity calculations 
were 1) different operator failure probability for fuel assembly selection, 2) adjusting the 21-
PWR Control Rod waste package design, and 3) varying the loading scheme (no procedures on 
how the waste packages are to be selected and loaded at this time).  These sensitivity calculations 
provided a range of misload probabilities that are the same as the nominal probability all the way 
to zero probability.   
 
From the different sensitivity calculations, the lowest misload probability is based on the 
assumption that all fuel assemblies requiring control rods have them inserted upon arrival and all 
the 21-PWR waste packages contain absorber plates.  This sensitivity showed that no 21-PWR 
waste package could be misloaded based on operator error loading the wrong fuel assembly.  The 
only sequence for this scenario that has a probability of misload is based on the operator error of 
mislabeling the fuel assembly upon receipt and loading this fuel assembly into a 21-PWR 
Absorber Plate waste package.  
 
The results from the other sensitivity calculations had misload probabilities that are similar or 
lower than the results from the nominal calculation.  Therefore, the nominal case can be viewed 
as the upper bound misload probability. 
 
The results from the misload calculation are reasonable based on the inputs.  The misload 
calculation is directly driven by the human error probabilities used for the top events.  The 
human error probabilities are appropriate for this misload calculation, since there are no loading 
procedures available at this time.  Once this information becomes available, a detailed human 
factors analysis can be performed in order to develop specific human error probabilities instead 
of using representative human error probabilities.   
 
The results are suitable for their intended use.  The results provide a representative misload 
probability based on the current available information.  
 
This calculation contains four attachments: 
 
• Attachment I contains the PWR misload event tree graphics along with information about 
the different PWR misload end states. 
 
• Attachment II contains the BWR misload event tree graphics along with information 
about the different BWR misload end states. 
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• Attachment III contains a paper copy of the Mathcad calculations performed. 
 
• Attachment IV is a CD-ROM containing two files developed for the SAPHIRE 
evaluations.  One file contains the SAPHIRE binary data files for the PWR misload 
evaluation and the other file contains the SAPHIRE data files for the BWR misload 
evaluation.  The two files are in a compressed format, which contain the SAPHIRE 
binary data files.  Extracting the compressed file to a local directory using Winzip 8.1 
will restore the SAPHIRE files to a useable form.  The compressed files are called 
pwr-misload-saph.zip and bwr-misload-saph.zip.  The pwr-misload-saph.zip file is 
94,328 bytes large, and the date and time of last update are 09/15/2003, 03:52 pm.  The 
bwr-misload-saph.zip file is 49,173 bytes large, and the date and time of last update are 
09/15/2003, 03:53 pm. 
 
The CD-ROM also contains the Mathcad file used in the calculation called 
misload-all.mcd, which is 165,923 bytes large and the date and time of last update are 
9/11/2003, 04:36 pm. 
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ATTACHMENT I 
PWR MISLOAD EVENT TREES 
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Table I-1.  PWR Waste Package Misload Event Tree Sequences 
Sequences Description 
1C 
This sequence starts with loading the 21-PWR Absorber Plate (21-PWR ABS) waste package.  The 
correct waste package was requested and selected.  The fuel assembly based on the design criteria 
of the waste package was selected and placed into the waste package.  This sequence represents 
the correct loading of the waste package; therefore, the end state is denoted as “OK.”  
2C 
This sequence starts with loading the 21-PWR ABS waste package.  The correct waste package was 
requested and selected.  The correct fuel assembly based on its associated records was selected.  
However, during the receipt of the fuel assembly, the fuel assembly characteristics from the shipping 
records were incorrectly documented.  Therefore, the fuel assembly characteristics do not represent 
the information documented.  The independent verifier discovers the discrepancy and makes the 
correct change.  Because, the independent verifier discovered and corrected the documentation of 
the fuel assembly, the correct fuel assembly is loaded into the correct waste package.  This sequence 
represents the correct loading of the waste package; therefore, the end state is denoted as “OK.” 
3C 
This sequence starts with loading the 21-PWR ABS waste package.  The correct waste package was 
requested and selected.  The correct fuel assembly based on its associated records was selected.  
However, during the receipt of the fuel assembly, the fuel assembly characteristics from the shipping 
records were incorrectly documented.  Therefore, the fuel assembly characteristics do not represent 
the information documented.  The independent verifier fails to discover this discrepancy.  Because the 
independent verifier failed to notice the discrepancy, an incorrectly documented fuel assembly was 
loaded into the waste package.  The fuel assembly characteristics are outside of the design of the 
waste package.  This sequence represents a critical misload; therefore, the end state is denoted as 
“POT-CRIT.” 
4C 
This sequence starts with loading the 21-PWR ABS waste package.  The correct waste package was 
requested and selected.  An error of commission (EOC) - request was committed and the wrong fuel 
assembly was requested.  The fuel assembly was a South Texas fuel assembly and therefore, the 
mistake was recovered.  Since the operator mistake was recovered, the end state is denoted as “OK.”
5C 
This sequence starts with loading the 21-PWR ABS waste package.  The correct waste package was 
requested and selected.  An EOC - request was committed and the wrong fuel assembly was 
requested.  The fuel assembly was a fuel assembly requiring a control rod to be inserted and 
therefore, the independent checker discovered the mistake.  Based on assumption 5.12, all control 
rod fuel assemblies loaded into an absorber plate waste package will be recovered; therefore, this 
end state is denoted as “OK.” 
6C 
This sequence starts with loading the 21-PWR ABS waste package.  The correct waste package was 
requested and selected.  An EOC - selection was committed and the wrong fuel assembly was 
selected.  The fuel assembly was a South Texas fuel assembly and therefore, the mistake was 
recovered.  Since the operator mistake was recovered, the end state is denoted as “OK.” 
7C & 8C 
These sequences start with loading the 21-PWR ABS waste package.  The correct waste package 
was requested and selected.  An EOC - selection was committed; however, the correct fuel assembly 
was selected (for bookkeeping purposes these two sequences are in the event tree).  The correct fuel 
assembly for the waste package was selected and the independent checker verified the fuel 
assembly.  Since the correct fuel assembly was selected, the end state is denoted as “OK.” 
9C 
This sequence starts with loading the 21-PWR ABS waste package.  The correct waste package was 
requested and selected.  An EOC - select was committed and the wrong fuel assembly was selected.  
The fuel assembly is outside the design of the waste package, but the independent checker 
discovered the mistake.  Since the operator mistake was recovered, the end state is denoted as “OK.”
10C 
This sequence starts with loading the 21-PWR ABS waste package.  The correct waste package was 
requested and selected.  An EOC - select was committed and the wrong fuel assembly was selected.  
The fuel assembly is outside the design of the waste package.  The independent checker fails to 
discover this mistake and the fuel assembly gets loaded into the waste package.  Since the operator 
mistake was not recovered, the end state is denoted as “POT-CRIT. 
11C 
This sequence starts with loading the 21-PWR ABS waste package.  The Line operator requests the 
correct waste package; however, the DC operator selects (EOC) the wrong waste package.  During 
the verification process, this mistake was detected and the loading process stopped.  Since the 
operator mistake was discovered, the end state is denoted as “OK.” 
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Table I-1.  PWR Waste Package Misload Event Tree Sequences (continued) 
Sequence Description 
12C 
This sequence starts with loading the 21-PWR ABS waste package.  The Line operator requests the 
correct waste package; however, the DC operator selects (EOC) the wrong waste package.  During 
the verification process, the operator fails to discover this mistake.  The loading process continues 
with the loading of the intended fuel assembly.  The intended fuel assembly is loaded into the 21-
PWR Control Rod (21-PWR CR) waste package, which has no criticality control mechanism.  A final 
verification detects the wrong waste package was loaded.  Since the mistake was discovered, the end 
state is denoted as “OK.” 
13C 
This sequence starts with loading the 21-PWR ABS waste package.  The Line operator requests the 
correct waste package; however, the DC operator selects (EOC) the wrong waste package.  During 
the verification process, the operator fails to discover this mistake.  The loading process continues 
with the loading of the intended fuel assembly.  The intended fuel assembly is loaded into the 21-
PWR CR waste package, which has no criticality control mechanism.  A final verification fails to detect 
the fuel assemblies were loaded into the wrong waste package.  Since the mistake was not 
discovered, the end state is denoted as “POT-CRIT.” 
14C 
This sequence starts with loading the 21-PWR ABS waste package.  The Line operator requests the 
correct waste package; however, the DC operator selects (EOC) the wrong waste package (21-PWR 
CR).  During the verification process, the operator fails to discover this mistake.  An EOC - request 
was committed and the wrong fuel assembly was requested.  The fuel assembly was a South Texas 
fuel assembly and therefore, the mistake was recovered.  Since the operator mistake was recovered, 
the end state is denoted as “OK.” 
15C 
This sequence starts with loading the 21-PWR ABS waste package.  The Line operator requests the 
correct waste package; however, the DC operator selects (EOC) the wrong waste package (21-PWR 
CR).  During the verification process, the operator fails to discover this mistake.  An EOC - request 
was committed and the wrong fuel assembly was requested.  The fuel assembly was a fuel assembly 
requiring a control rod to be inserted and therefore, the independent checker discovered the mistake. 
Since the operator mistake was recovered, the end state is denoted as “OK.” 
16C 
This sequence starts with loading the 21-PWR ABS waste package.  The Line operator requests the 
correct waste package; however, the DC operator selects (EOC) the wrong waste package (21-PWR 
CR).  During the verification process, the operator fails to discover this mistake.  An EOC - selection 
was committed and the wrong fuel assembly was selected.  The fuel assembly was a South Texas 
fuel assembly and therefore, the mistake was recovered.  Since the operator mistake was recovered, 
the end state is denoted as “OK.” 
17C 
This sequence starts with loading the 21-PWR ABS waste package.  The Line operator requests the 
correct waste package; however, the DC operator selects (EOC) the wrong waste package (21-PWR 
CR).  During the verification process, the operator fails to discover this mistake.  An EOC - selection 
was committed and the fuel assembly for a 21-PWR ABS waste package was selected.  This is an 
incorrect fuel assembly to be loaded into the 21-PWR CR waste package, however, the independent 
checker verified this mistake and it was recovered.  Since the operator mistake was recovered, the 
end state is denoted as “OK.”  
18C 
This sequence starts with loading the 21-PWR ABS waste package.  The Line operator requests the 
correct waste package; however, the DC operator selects (EOC) the wrong waste package (21-PWR 
CR).  During the verification process, the operator fails to discover this mistake.  An EOC - selection 
was committed and the fuel assembly for a 21-PWR ABS waste package was selected.  This is an 
incorrect fuel assembly to be loaded into the 21-PWR CR waste package and the independent 
checker failed to discover this mistake.  Since the operator mistake was not recovered, the end state 
is denoted as “POT-CRIT.” 
19C 
This sequence starts with loading the 21-PWR ABS waste package.  The Line operator requests the 
correct waste package; however, the DC operator selects (EOC) the wrong waste package (21-PWR 
CR).  During the verification process, the operator fails to discover this mistake.  An EOC - selection 
was committed and the fuel assembly for a 21-PWR CR waste package was selected.  This is the 
correct fuel assembly to be loaded into the 21-PWR CR waste package, however, this is not the 
intended fuel assembly and the control rod is not inserted.  The independent checker discovers the 
mistake.  Since the operator mistake was recovered, the end state is denoted as “OK.” 
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Table I-1.  PWR Waste Package Misload Event Tree Sequences (continued) 
Sequence Description 
20C 
This sequence starts with loading the 21-PWR ABS waste package.  The Line operator requests the 
correct waste package; however, the DC operator selects (EOC) the wrong waste package (21-PWR 
CR).  During the verification process, the operator fails to discover this mistake.  An EOC - selection 
was committed and the fuel assembly for a 21-PWR CR waste package was selected.  This is the 
correct fuel assembly to be loaded into the 21-PWR CR waste package, however, this is not the 
intended fuel assembly and the control rod is not inserted.  The independent checker fails to discover 
the mistake.  Since the operator mistake was not recovered, the end state is denoted as “POT-CRIT.” 
21C 
This sequence starts with loading the 21-PWR ABS waste package.  The Line operator requests the 
correct waste package; however, the DC operator selects (EOC) the wrong waste package (South 
Texas).  During the verification process, the operator discovers this mistake and the loading process 
is stopped.   Since the operator mistake was recovered, the end state is denoted as “OK.” 
22C 
This sequence starts with loading the 21-PWR ABS waste package.  The Line operator requests the 
wrong waste package (EOC - request) and the DC operator selects this waste package (21-PWR 
CR).  During the verification process, this mistake was detected and the loading process stopped.  
Since the operator mistake was discovered, the end state is denoted as “OK.” 
23C 
This sequence starts with loading the 21-PWR ABS waste package.  The Line operator requests the 
wrong waste package (EOC - request) and the DC operator selects this waste package (21-PWR 
CR).  During the verification process, the operator fails to discover this mistake.  The loading process 
continues with the loading of the intended fuel assembly.  The intended fuel assembly is loaded into 
the 21-PWR CR waste package, which has no criticality control mechanism.  A final verification 
detects the wrong waste package was loaded.  Since the mistake was discovered, the end state is 
denoted as “OK.” 
24C 
This sequence starts with loading the 21-PWR ABS waste package.  The Line operator requests the 
wrong waste package (EOC - request) and the DC operator selects this waste package (21-PWR 
CR).  During the verification process, the operator fails to discover this mistake.  The loading process 
continues with the loading of the intended fuel assembly.  The intended fuel assembly is loaded into 
the 21-PWR CR waste package, which has no criticality control mechanism.  A final verification fails 
to detect the fuel assemblies were loaded into the wrong waste package.  Since the mistake was not 
discovered, the end state is denoted as “POT-CRIT.” 
25C 
This sequence starts with loading the 21-PWR ABS waste package.  The Line operator requests the 
wrong waste package (EOC - request) and the DC operator selects this waste package (21-PWR 
CR).  During the verification process, the operator fails to discover this mistake.  An EOC - request 
was committed and the wrong fuel assembly was requested.  The fuel assembly was a South Texas 
fuel assembly and therefore, the mistake was recovered.  Since the operator mistake was recovered, 
the end state is denoted as “OK.” 
26C 
This sequence starts with loading the 21-PWR ABS waste package.  The Line operator requests the 
wrong waste package (EOC - request) and the DC operator selects this waste package (21-PWR 
CR).  During the verification process, the operator fails to discover this mistake.  An EOC - request 
was committed and the wrong fuel assembly was requested.  The fuel assembly was a fuel assembly 
requiring a control rod to be inserted and therefore, the independent checker discovered the mistake. 
Since the operator mistake was recovered, the end state is denoted as “OK.” 
27C 
This sequence starts with loading the 21-PWR ABS waste package.  The Line operator requests the 
wrong waste package (EOC - request) and the DC operator selects this waste package (21-PWR 
CR).  During the verification process, the operator fails to discover this mistake.  An EOC - selection 
was committed and the wrong fuel assembly was selected.  The fuel assembly was a South Texas 
fuel assembly and therefore, the mistake was recovered.  Since the operator mistake was recovered, 
the end state is denoted as “OK.” 
28C 
This sequence starts with loading the 21-PWR ABS waste package.  The Line operator requests the 
wrong waste package (EOC - request) and the DC operator selects this waste package (21-PWR 
CR).  During the verification process, the operator fails to discover this mistake.  An EOC - selection 
was committed and the fuel assembly for a 21-PWR ABS waste package was selected.  This is an 
incorrect fuel assembly to be loaded into the 21-PWR CR waste package, however, the independent 
checker verified this mistake and it was recovered.  Since the operator mistake was recovered, the 
end state is denoted as “OK.” 
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Table I-1.  PWR Waste Package Misload Event Tree Sequences (continued) 
Sequence Description 
29C 
This sequence starts with loading the 21-PWR ABS waste package.  The Line operator requests the 
wrong waste package (EOC - request) and the DC operator selects this waste package (21-PWR 
CR).  During the verification process, the operator fails to discover this mistake.  An EOC - selection 
was committed and the fuel assembly for a 21-PWR ABS waste package was selected.  This is an 
incorrect fuel assembly to be loaded into the 21-PWR CR waste package and the independent 
checker failed to discover this mistake.  Since the operator mistake was not recovered, the end state 
is denoted as “POT-CRIT.” 
30C 
This sequence starts with loading the 21-PWR ABS waste package.  The Line operator requests the 
wrong waste package (EOC - request) and the DC operator selects this waste package (21-PWR 
CR).  During the verification process, the operator fails to discover this mistake.  An EOC - selection 
was committed and the fuel assembly for a 21-PWR CR waste package was selected.  This is the 
correct fuel assembly to be loaded into the 21-PWR CR waste package, however, this is not the 
intended fuel assembly and the control rod is not inserted.  The independent checker discovers the 
mistake.  Since the operator mistake was recovered, the end state is denoted as “OK.” 
31C 
This sequence starts with loading the 21-PWR ABS waste package.  The Line operator requests the 
wrong waste package (EOC - request) and the DC operator selects this waste package (21-PWR 
CR).  During the verification process, the operator fails to discover this mistake.  An EOC - selection 
was committed and the fuel assembly for a 21-PWR CR waste package was selected.  This is the 
correct fuel assembly to be loaded into the 21-PWR CR waste package, however, this is not the 
intended fuel assembly and the control rod is not inserted.  The independent checker fails to discover 
the mistake.  Since the operator mistake was not recovered, the end state is denoted as “POT-CRIT.” 
32C 
through 
37C 
These sequences are the same as those discussed above except their probabilities would be smaller; 
therefore, they are not expanded for evaluation. 
38C 
This sequence starts with loading the 21-PWR CR waste package.  The correct waste package was 
requested and selected.  The fuel assembly based on the design criteria of the waste package is 
selected and placed into the waste package.  This sequence represents the correct loading of a 
waste package; therefore, the end state is denoted as “OK.”  
39C 
This sequence starts with loading the 21-PWR CR waste package.  The correct waste package was 
requested and selected.  The correct fuel assembly based on its associated records was selected.  
However, during the receipt of the fuel assembly, the fuel assembly characteristics from the shipping 
records were incorrectly documented.  Therefore, the fuel assembly characteristics do not represent 
the information documented.  The independent verifier discovers the discrepancy and makes the 
correct change.  Because, the independent verifier discovered and corrected the documentation of 
the fuel assembly, the correct fuel assembly is loaded into the correct waste package.  This sequence 
represents the correct loading of a waste package; therefore, the end state is denoted as “OK.” 
40C 
This sequence starts with loading the 21-PWR CR waste package.  The correct waste package was 
requested and selected.  The correct fuel assembly based on its associated records was selected.  
However, during the receipt of the fuel assembly, the fuel assembly characteristics from the shipping 
records were incorrectly documented.  Therefore, the fuel assembly characteristics do not represent 
the information written down.  The independent verifier fails to discover this discrepancy.  Because 
the independent verifier failed to notice the discrepancy, an incorrectly documented fuel assembly 
was loaded into the waste package.  The fuel assembly characteristics are below the design of the 
waste package (i.e., the fuel assembly will have a control rod inserted).  This sequence represents a 
misload, but it is not critical; therefore, the end state is denoted as “OK.” 
41C 
This sequence starts with loading the 21-PWR CR waste package.  The correct waste package was 
requested and selected.  An EOC - request was committed and the wrong fuel assembly was 
requested.  The fuel assembly was a South Texas fuel assembly and therefore, the mistake was 
recovered.  Since the operator mistake was recovered, the end state is denoted as “OK.” 
42C 
This sequence starts with loading the 21-PWR CR waste package.  The correct waste package was 
requested and selected.  An EOC - request was committed and the wrong fuel assembly was 
requested.  The fuel assembly requested does not require a control rod to be inserted and therefore, 
the independent checker discovered the mistake.  Based on the assumption, all control rod fuel 
assemblies loaded into a waste package will be recovered; therefore, this end state is denoted as 
“OK.” 
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Table I-1.  PWR Waste Package Misload Event Tree Sequences (continued) 
Sequence Description 
43C 
This sequence starts with loading the 21-PWR CR waste package.  The correct waste package was 
requested and selected.  An EOC - selection was committed and the wrong fuel assembly was 
selected.  The fuel assembly was a South Texas fuel assembly and therefore, the mistake was 
recovered.  Since the operator mistake was recovered, the end state is denoted as “OK.” 
44C 
This sequence starts with loading the 21-PWR CR waste package.  The correct waste package was 
requested and selected.  An EOC - selection was committed and the wrong fuel assembly was 
selected.  The fuel assembly was a lower reactive fuel assembly and the mistake was recovered.  
Since the operator mistake was recovered, the end state is denoted as “OK.” 
45C 
This sequence starts with loading the 21-PWR CR waste package.  The correct waste package was 
requested and selected.  An EOC - selection was committed and the wrong fuel assembly was 
selected.  The fuel assembly was a lower reactive fuel assembly and a control rod was inserted.  The 
independent checker failed to verify the correct fuel assembly; however, a control rod was inserted 
which makes the fuel assembly below the design of the waste package.  Although the operator 
mistake was not recovered, the end state is not critical and denoted as “OK.” 
46C & 47C 
These sequences start with loading the 21-PWR CR waste package.  The correct waste package was 
requested and selected.  An EOC - selection was committed; however, the correct fuel assembly was 
selected (for bookkeeping purposes these two sequences are in the event tree).  The correct fuel 
assembly for the waste package was selected and the independent checker verified the fuel 
assembly.  Since the correct fuel assembly was selected, the end state is denoted as “OK.” 
48C 
This sequence starts with loading the 21-PWR CR waste package.  The Line operator requests the 
correct waste package; however, the DC operator selects (EOC) the wrong waste package.  During 
the verification process, this mistake was detected and the loading process stopped.  Since the 
operator mistake was discovered, the end state is denoted as “OK.” 
49C 
through 
57C 
This sequence starts with loading the 21-PWR CR waste package.  The Line operator requests the 
correct waste package; however, the DC operator selects (EOC) the wrong waste package.  During 
the verification process, the operator fails to discover this mistake.  The loading process continues 
assuming the waste package is the 21-PWR CR.  Using the assumption that fuel assemblies without 
a control rod will be detected and recovered, all fuel assemblies will contain a control rod and 
therefore, be below the design of the waste package.  Since all misload fuel assemblies will be 
detected and recovered, the end states for these sequences are denoted as “OK.” 
58C 
This sequence starts with loading the 21-PWR CR waste package.  The Line operator requests the 
correct waste package; however, the DC operator selects (EOC) the wrong waste package (South 
Texas).  During the verification process, the operator discovers this mistake and the loading process 
is stopped.   Since the operator mistake was recovered, the end state is denoted as “OK.” 
59C 
This sequence starts with loading the 21-PWR CR waste package.  The Line operator requests the 
wrong (EOC - request) waste package and the DC operator selects this wrong waste package.  
During the verification process, this mistake was detected and the loading process stopped.  Since 
the operator mistake was discovered, the end state is denoted as “OK.” 
60C 
through 
68C 
This sequence starts with loading the 21-PWR CR waste package.  The Line operator requests the 
wrong (EOC - request) waste package and the DC operator selects the wrong waste package.  
During the verification process, the operator fails to discover this mistake.  The loading process 
continues assuming the waste package is the 21-PWR CR.  Using the assumption that fuel 
assemblies without a control rod will be detected and recovered, all fuel assemblies will contain a 
control rod and therefore, be below the design of the waste package.  Since all misload fuel 
assemblies will be detected and recovered, the end states for these sequences are denoted as “OK.” 
69C 
through 
74C 
These sequences are the same as those discussed above except their probabilities would be smaller; 
therefore, they are not expanded for evaluation. 
75C 
through 
88C 
These sequences start with loading the 12-PWR Long (South Texas) waste package.  All EOCs 
either request or selection will be recovered for both the waste package and the fuel assembly.  Since 
all errors will be recovered, these sequence end states are denoted as “OK.” 
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ATTACHMENT II 
BWR MISLOAD EVENT TREES 
Commercial Spent Nuclear Fuel Waste Package Misload Analysis  
 
CAL-WHS-MD-000003 REV 00A II-2 September 2003 
Table II-1.  BWR Waste Package Misload Sequences 
Sequences Description 
1C 
This sequence starts with loading the 44-BWR Absorber Plate (44-BWR ABS) waste package.  The 
correct waste package was requested and selected.  The fuel assembly based on the design criteria 
of the waste package is selected and placed into the waste package.  This sequence represents the 
correct loading of the waste package; therefore, the end state is denoted as “OK.”  
2C 
This sequence starts with loading the 44-BWR ABS waste package.  The correct waste package was 
requested and selected.  The correct fuel assembly based on its associated records was selected.  
However, during the receipt of the fuel assembly, the fuel assembly characteristics from the shipping 
records were incorrectly documented.  Therefore, the fuel assembly characteristics do not represent 
the information documented.  The independent verifier discovers the discrepancy and makes the 
correct change.  Because, the independent verifier discovered and corrected the documentation of 
the fuel assembly, the correct fuel assembly is loaded into the correct waste package.  This sequence 
represents the correct loading of the waste package; therefore, the end state is denoted as “OK.” 
3C 
This sequence starts with loading the 44-BWR ABS waste package.  The correct waste package was 
requested and selected.  The correct fuel assembly based on its associated records was selected.  
However, during the receipt of the fuel assembly, the fuel assembly characteristics from the shipping 
records were incorrectly documented.  Therefore, the fuel assembly characteristics do not represent 
the information documented.  The independent verifier fails to discover this discrepancy.  Because the 
independent verifier failed to notice the discrepancy, an incorrectly documented fuel assembly was 
loaded into the waste package.  The fuel assembly characteristics are outside of the design of the 
waste package.  This sequence represents a critical misload; therefore, the end state is denoted as 
“POT-CRIT.” 
4C 
This sequence starts with loading the 44-BWR ABS waste package.  The correct waste package was 
requested and selected.  An error of commission (EOC) - request was committed and the fuel 
assembly was requested.  The fuel assembly is the correct fuel assembly and is only listed for 
bookkeeping and the mistake was recovered.  Since the operator mistake was recovered, the end 
state is denoted as “OK.” 
5C 
This sequence starts with loading the 44-BWR ABS waste package.  The correct waste package was 
requested and selected.  An EOC - request was committed and the wrong fuel assembly was 
requested.  The fuel assembly that requested was a fuel assembly outside of the design of the waste 
package and the independent checker discovered this mistake.  Since the operator mistake was 
recovered, this end state is denoted as “OK.” 
6C 
This sequence starts with loading the 44-BWR ABS waste package.  The correct waste package was 
requested and selected.  An EOC - request was committed and the wrong fuel assembly was 
requested.  The fuel assembly that requested was a fuel assembly outside of the design of the waste 
package and the independent checker fails to discover this mistake.  Since the operator failed to 
discover the mistake, the misload was not recovered.  This end state is denoted as “POT-CRIT.” 
7C & 8C 
These sequences start with loading the 44-BWR ABS waste package.  The correct waste package 
was requested and selected.  An EOC - selection was committed; however, the correct fuel assembly 
was selected (for bookkeeping purposes these two sequences are in the event tree).  The correct fuel 
assembly for the waste package was selected and the independent checker verified the fuel 
assembly.  Since the correct fuel assembly was selected, the end state is denoted as “OK.” 
9C 
This sequence starts with loading the 44-BWR ABS waste package.  The correct waste package was 
requested and selected.  An EOC - select was committed and the wrong fuel assembly was selected.  
The fuel assembly is outside the design of the waste package, but the independent checker 
discovered the mistake.  Since the operator mistake was recovered, the end state is denoted as “OK.”
10C 
This sequence starts with loading the 44-BWR ABS waste package.  The correct waste package was 
requested and selected.  An EOC - select was committed and the wrong fuel assembly was selected.  
The fuel assembly is outside the design of the waste package.  The independent checker fails to 
discover this mistake and the fuel assembly gets loaded into the waste package.  Since the operator 
mistake was not recovered, the end state is denoted as “POT-CRIT. 
11C 
This sequence starts with loading the 44-BWR ABS waste package.  The Line operator requests the 
correct waste package; however, the DC operator selects (EOC) the wrong waste package (24-
BWR).  During the verification process, the operator discovers this mistake and the loading process is 
stopped.   Since the operator mistake was recovered, the end state is denoted as “OK.” 
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Table II-1.  BWR Waste Package Misload Sequences (continued) 
Sequence Description 
12C 
This sequence starts with loading the 44-BWR ABS waste package.  The Line operator requests the 
wrong waste package (EOC - request) and the DC operator selects this waste package (24-BWR).  
During the verification process, this mistake was detected and the loading process stopped.  Since 
the operator mistake was discovered, the end state is denoted as “OK.” 
13C 
This sequence starts with loading the 44-BWR ABS waste package.  The Line operator requests the 
wrong waste package (EOC - request, 24-BWR) and the DC operator selects (EOC) the waste 
package that was not requested (44-BWR).  This sequence can be expanded to look like sequences 
1 through 10.  However, these sequences were not created because their probabilities are negligible 
compared to the probabilities from sequences 1 through 10.  Therefore, the end state is denoted as 
“OK.” 
14C 
This sequence starts with loading the 24-BWR waste package.  The correct waste package was 
requested and selected.  The fuel assembly based on the design criteria of the waste package is 
selected and placed into the waste package.  This sequence represents the correct loading of the 
waste package; therefore, the end state is denoted as “OK.”  
15C 
This sequence starts with loading the 24-BWR waste package.  The correct waste package was 
requested and selected.  The correct fuel assembly based on its associated records was selected.  
However, during the receipt of the fuel assembly, the fuel assembly characteristics from the shipping 
records were incorrectly documented.  Therefore, the fuel assembly characteristics do not represent 
the information documented.  The independent verifier discovers the discrepancy and makes the 
correct change.  Because, the independent verifier discovered and corrected the documentation of 
the fuel assembly, the correct fuel assembly is loaded into the correct waste package.  This sequence 
represents the correct loading of the waste package; therefore, the end state is denoted as “OK.” 
16C 
This sequence starts with loading the 24-PWR waste package.  The correct waste package was 
requested and selected.  The correct fuel assembly based on its associated records was selected.  
However, during the receipt of the fuel assembly, the fuel assembly characteristics from the shipping 
records were incorrectly documented.  Therefore, the fuel assembly characteristics do not represent 
the information documented.  The independent verifier fails to discover this discrepancy.  Because the 
independent verifier failed to notice the discrepancy, an incorrectly documented fuel assembly was 
loaded into the waste package.  The fuel assembly characteristics are below the design of the waste 
package (i.e., the fuel assembly enrichment and burn-up are below the loading curve).  This 
sequence represents a misload, but it is not critical; therefore, the end state is denoted as “OK.” 
17C 
This sequence starts with loading the 24-BWR ABS waste package.  The correct waste package was 
requested and selected.  An error of commission (EOC) - request was committed and the fuel 
assembly was requested.  The fuel assembly is the correct fuel assembly and is only listed for 
bookkeeping purposes and the mistake was recovered.  Since the operator mistake was recovered, 
the end state is denoted as “OK.” 
18C 
This sequence starts with loading the 24-BWR ABS waste package.  The correct waste package was 
requested and selected.  An EOC - request was committed and the wrong fuel assembly was 
requested.  The fuel assembly that was requested was a fuel assembly below the design of the waste 
package and the independent checker discovered this mistake.  Since the operator mistake was 
recovered, this end state is denoted as “OK.” 
19C 
This sequence starts with loading the 24-BWR ABS waste package.  The correct waste package was 
requested and selected.  An EOC - request was committed and the wrong fuel assembly was 
requested.  The fuel assembly that was requested was a fuel assembly below the design of the waste 
package and the independent checker failed to discover this mistake.  Since the operator failed to 
discover the mistake, the misload was not recovered.  Since the fuel assembly is below the design 
and the misload does not have a criticality potential, the end state is denoted as “OK.” 
20C & 21C 
These sequences start with loading the 24-BWR ABS waste package.  The correct waste package 
was requested and selected.  An EOC - selection was committed; however, the selection is assumed 
the correct fuel assembly (for bookkeeping purposes these two sequences are in the event tree).  The 
correct fuel assembly for the waste package was selected and the independent checker verified the 
fuel assembly.  Since the correct fuel assembly was selected, the end state is denoted as “OK.” 
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Table II-1.  BWR Waste Package Misload Sequences (continued) 
Sequence Description 
22C 
This sequence starts with loading the 24-BWR ABS waste package.  The correct waste package was 
requested and selected.  An EOC - select was committed and the wrong fuel assembly was selected.  
The fuel assembly is below the design of the waste package.  The independent checker discovered 
the mistake and corrected the mistake.  Since the operator mistake was recovered, the end state is 
denoted as “OK.” 
23C 
This sequence starts with loading the 24-BWR ABS waste package.  The correct waste package was 
requested and selected.  An EOC - select was committed and the wrong fuel assembly was selected.  
The fuel assembly is below the design of the waste package.  The independent checker fails to 
discover this mistake and the fuel assembly gets loaded into the waste package.  Since the fuel 
assembly is below the design of the waste package even though the operator mistake was not 
recovered, there is no misload criticality potential.  The end state is therefore denoted as “OK. 
24C 
This sequence starts with loading the 24-BWR ABS waste package.  The Line operator requests the 
correct waste package; however, the DC operator selects (EOC) the wrong waste package (44-
BWR).  During the verification process, the operator discovers this mistake and the loading process is 
stopped.   Since the operator mistake was recovered, the end state is denoted as “OK.” 
25C 
This sequence starts with loading the 24-BWR ABS waste package.  The Line operator requests the 
wrong waste package (EOC - request) and the DC operator selects this waste package (44-BWR).  
During the verification process, this mistake was detected and the loading process stopped.  Since 
the operator mistake was discovered, the end state is denoted as “OK.” 
26C 
This sequence starts with loading the 24-BWR ABS waste package.  The Line operator requests the 
wrong waste package (EOC - request, 44-BWR) and the DC operator selects (EOC) the waste 
package that was not requested (44-BWR).  This sequence can be expanded to look like sequences 
14 through 23.  However, these sequences were not created because their probabilities are negligible 
compared to the probabilities from sequences 14 through 23.  Therefore, the end state is denoted as 
“OK.” 
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FWP12L1
WP12L
WP21CR WP12L+:= FWP12L1 0.632= fraction of 12-PWR Long
Fraction of 21-PWR Absorber Plate and 12-PWR Long waste packages
FWP21AB1
WP21AB
WP21AB WP12L+:= FWP21AB1 0.963= fraction of 21-PWR Abs Plate
FWP12L2
WP12L
WP21AB WP12L+:= FWP12L2 0.037= fraction of 12-PWR Long
Fraction of 21-PWR Absorber Plate and 21-PWR Control Rod waste packages
FWP21AB2
WP21AB
WP21AB WP21CR+:= FWP21AB2 0.978= fraction of 21-PWR Abs Plate
FWP21CR2
WP21CR
WP21AB WP21CR+:= FWP21CR2 0.022= fraction of 21-PWR Control Rod
Fraction of 44-BWR Absorber Plate and 24-BWR Absorber Plate waste packages
FWP44AB1
WP44AB
WP44AB WP24AB+:= FWP44AB1 0.971= fraction of 44-BWR Abs Plate
FWP24AB1
WP24AB
WP44AB WP24AB+:= FWP24AB1 0.029= fraction of 24-BWR Absorber Plate
Waste Package and Fuel Assembly Fractional Calculations
WP21AB 4299:= number of 21-PWR Absorber Plate waste packages
WP21CR 95:= number of 21-PWR Control Rod waste packages
WP12L 163:= number of 12-PWR Long waste packages
WP44AB 2831:= number of 44-BWR Absorber Plate waste packages
WP24AB 84:= number of 24-BWR Absorber Plate waste packages
Fraction of PWR waste packages (all)
FWP21AB
WP21AB
WP21AB WP21CR+ WP12L+:= FWP21AB 0.943= fraction of 21-PWR ABS Plate
FWP21CR
WP21CR
WP21AB WP21CR+ WP12L+:= FWP21CR 0.021= fraction of 21-PWR Control Rod
FWP12L
WP12L
WP21AB WP21CR+ WP12L+:= FWP12L 0.036= fraction of 12-PWR Long
Fraction of 21-PWR Control Rod and 12-PWR Long waste packages
FWP21CR1
WP21CR
WP21CR WP12L+:= FWP21CR1 0.368= fraction of 21-PWR Control Rod
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FFA12L1
FA12L
FA21CR FA12L+:= FFA12L1 0.495= fraction of 12-PWR Long
Fraction of 21-PWR Absorber Plate and 12-PWR Long fuel assemblies
FFA21AB1
FA21AB
FA21AB FA12L+:= FFA21AB1 0.979= fraction of 21-PWR Abs Plate
FFA12L2
FA12L
FA21AB FA12L+:= FFA12L2 0.021= fraction of 12-PWR Long
Fraction of 21-PWR Absorber Plate and 21-PWR Control Rod fuel assemblies
FFA21AB2
FA21AB
FA21AB FA21CR+:= FFA21AB2 0.978= fraction of 21-PWR Abs Plate
FFA21CR2
FA21CR
FA21AB FA21CR+:= FFA21CR2 0.022= fraction of 21-PWR Control Rod
Fraction of 44-BWR Absorber Plate and 24-BWR Absorber Plate fuel assemblies
FFA44AB1
FA44AB
FA44AB FA24AB+:= FFA44AB1 0.984= fraction of 44-BWR Abs Plate
FFA24AB1
FA24AB
FA44AB FA24AB+:= FFA24AB1 0.016= fraction of 24-BWR Absorber Plate
Fuel Assembly Fractional Calculations
FA21AB 90262:= number of 21-PWR Absorber Plate fuel assemblies
FA21CR 1992:= number of 21-PWR Control Rod fuel assemblies
FA12L 1955:= number of 12-PWR Long fuel assemblies
FA44AB 124532:= number of 44-BWR Absorber Plate fuel assemblies
FA24AB 2013:= number of 24-BWR Absorber Plate fuel assemblies
Fraction of PWR  fuel assemblies  (all)
FFA21AB
FA21AB
FA21AB FA21CR+ FA12L+:= FFA21AB 0.958= fraction of 21-PWR Abs Plate
FFA21CR
FA21CR
FA21AB FA21CR+ FA12L+:= FFA21CR 0.021= fraction of 21-PWR Control Rod
FFA12L
FA12L
FA21AB FA21CR+ FA12L+:= FFA12L 0.021= fraction of 12-PWR Long
Fraction of 21-PWR Control Rod and 12-PWR Long fuel assemblies
FFA21CR1
FA21CR
FA21CR FA12L+:= FFA21CR1 0.505= fraction of 21-PWR Control Rod
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λAB ln ABλ1( ):= ζAB
ln EFAB( )
1.645
:=
Since, the misload probability per waste package has uncertainty this needs to be included in the 
calculation.  Therefore, a Latin Hypercube sampling (LHS) routine is developed to calculate the probability 
of at least one waste package is misloaded taking into account the misload probability uncertainty.  [LHS 
is a stratified type of Monte Carlo Sampling (i.e., LHS stratifies the distribution into n pieces and then 
samples from each of the n pieces to obtain the value of interest).]
Set up the LHS routine.
ns 10000:= ns is the number of random samples
i 1 ns..:=
RDi 1− 0, i:=
RDi 1− 1, rnd 1.0( ):= Generate the LHS random numbers used for sampling.
RK1 csort RD 1,( ):=
Define sets of random values.  Each random value is selected 
within one of the equipropabable ns intervals that partition [0,1].X
0〈 〉 RK1
0〈 〉 1− runif ns 0, 1,( )+
ns
:=
Calculate a set of sample values for each of the random variables:
j 0 ns 1−..:=
YABj 0, qlnorm Xj 0, λAB, ζAB,( ):= sample from the lognormal distribution to obtain a misload probability
Section 6.2.1 Calculations
21-PWR Absorber Plate waste package Nominal Calculation
Calculate the uncertainty of misloading at least one Waste Package (i.e., one or more) with a fuel
assembly that is outside the design limits of the 21-PWR Absorber Plate waste package.
The mean, 5th,  50th, and 95th probability from analyzing the PWR misload event tree [21-PWR Absorber 
Plate (Table 11)].
mean  5th 50th 95th 
ABλ1 1.18 10 5−×:= ABfth 1.36 10 6−×:= ABftth 7.05 10 6−×:= ABnfth 3.68 10 5−×:=
The results were fit to a lognormal distribution (Swain and Guttmann 1983, pp. A-2 and A-4).
To obtain the required parameters for a lognormal distribution, the 5th and 95th are used to calculate
the error factor for the lognormal distribution.
EFAB
ABnfth
ABfth
:= EFAB 5.202=
Required parameters for the lognormal distribution.
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linterp PWP
1〈 〉 P1ABWP 0
〈 〉, 0.95,  2.321 10 1−×=95th percentile: 
linterp PWP
1〈 〉 P1ABWP 0
〈 〉, 0.5,  4.948 10 2−×=50th percentile: 
linterp PWP
1〈 〉 P1ABWP 0
〈 〉, 0.05,  9.715 10 3−×=5th percentile: 
mean probabilityµ1ABWP 7.573 10
2−×=µ1ABWP
1
ns 0
ns 1−
i
GABi 0,∑=⋅:=
At least One, 21-PWR Absorber Plate waste package is misloaded
Estimate the mean probability and percentiles of a 21-PWR Absorber Plate waste package 
being misloaded (i.e., a fuel assembly outside its design limit loaded into the waste package).
PWPj 1,
j
ns
:=
Set up cdf to determine the percentiles
P1ABWP sort GAB
0〈 〉 :=
Set up individual results to determine the mean and uncertainty parameters
The probability of at least one WP being misloaded is equal to 1 minus the 
probability of  zero waste packages misloaded.
GABj 0, 1 BABj 0,−:=
Probability of exactly 0 waste packages misloadedBABj 0, dbinom k0 n21ABS, YABj 0,, :=
The probability calculation follows the binomial process.
k0 0:=
k represents the number of misloaded waste packages (i.e., zero, one, etc.)
number of 21-PWR Absorber Plate waste packagesn21ABS 4299:=
Calculate the probability of at least one waste package (i.e., one or more) allowing the epistemic 
uncertainty of the misload probability.
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Estimate the mean probability and percentiles of a 21-PWR Control Rod waste package being 
misloaded (i.e., a fuel assembly outside its design limit loaded into the waste package).
P1CRWP sort GCR
0〈 〉 :=
Set up individual results to determine the mean and uncertainty parameters
The probability of at least one WP being misloaded is equal to 1 minus the 
probability of  zero waste packages misloaded.
GCRj 0, 1 BCRj 0,−:=
Probability of exactly 0 waste packages misloadedBCRj 0, dbinom k0 n21CR, YCRj 0,, :=
The probability calculation follows the binomial process.
number of 21-PWR Control Rod waste packagesn21CR 95:=
Calculate the probability of at least one waste package (i.e., one or more) allowing the epistemic 
uncertainty of the misload probability.
sample from the lognormal distribution to obtain a 
misload probability
YCRj 0, qlnorm Xj 0, λCR, ζCR,( ):=
ζCR
ln EFCR( )
1.645
:=
λCR ln CRλ1( ):=
Required parameters for the lognormal distribution.
EFCR 34.942=EFCR
CRnfth
CRfth
:=
To obtain the required parameters for a lognormal distribution, the 5th and 95th are used to calculate
the error factor for the lognormal distribution.
The results are fit to a lognormal distribution (Swain and Guttmann 1983, pp. A-2 and A-4).
CRnfth 5.36 10
6−×:=CRftth 1.59 10 7−×:=CRfth 4.39 10 9−×:=CRλ1 1.43 10 6−×:=
95th 50th 5thmean  
The mean,  5th, 50th, and 95th probability from analyzing the PWR misload event tree (21-PWR Control 
Rod).
Calculate the uncertainty of misloading at least one Waste Package (i.e., one or more) with a fuel
assembly that is outside the design limits of the 21-PWR Control Rod waste package.
21-PWR Control Rod waste package Nominal Calculation
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95th 
BWλ1 1.73 10 5−×:= BWfth 1.96 10 6−×:= BWftth 1.02 10 5−×:= BWnfth 5.56 10 5−×:=
The results are fit to a lognormal distribution (Swain and Guttmann 1983, pp. A-2 and A-4).
To obtain the required parameters for a lognormal distribution, the 5th and 95th are used to calculate
the error factor for the lognormal distribution.
EFBW
BWnfth
BWfth
:= EFBW 5.326=
Required parameters for the lognormal distribution.
λBW ln BWλ1( ):=
ζBW
ln EFBW( )
1.645
:=
YBWj 0, qlnorm Xj 0, λBW, ζBW,( ):= sample from the lognormal distribution to obtain a misload probability
Calculate the probability of at least one waste package (i.e., one or more) allowing the epistemic 
uncertainty of the misload probability.
n44BW 2831:= number of 44-BWR Absorber Plate waste packages
At least One, 21-PWR Control Rod waste package is misloaded
µ1CRWP
1
ns 0
ns 1−
i
GCRi 0,∑=⋅:= µ1CRWP 1.347 10
3−×= mean probability
5th percentile: linterp PWP
1〈 〉 P1CRWP 0
〈 〉, 0.05,  3.897 10 6−×=
50th percentile: linterp PWP
1〈 〉 P1CRWP 0
〈 〉, 0.5,  1.359 10 4−×=
95th percentile: linterp PWP
1〈 〉 P1CRWP 0
〈 〉, 0.95,  4.744 10 3−×=
Section 6.2.2 Calculations
44-BWR Absorber Plate waste package Nominal Calculation 
Calculate the uncertainty of misloading at least one Waste Package (i.e., one or more) with a fuel
assembly that is outside the design limits of the 44-BWR Absorber Plate waste package.
The mean, 5th, 50th, and 95th probability from analyzing the BWR misload event tree (44-BWR).
mean  5th 50th 
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The results are fit to a lognormal distribution (Swain and Guttmann 1983, pp. A-2 and A-4).
ABSnfth 1.50 10
5−×:=ABSftth 3.71 10 6−×:=ABSfth 9.86 10 7−×:=ABSλ1 5.37 10 6−×:=
95th 50th 5thmean  
The mean, 5th,  50th, and 95th probability from analyzing the PWR misload event tree (21-PWR Absorber 
Plate).
Calculate the uncertainty of misloading at least one Waste Package (i.e., one or more) with a fuel
assembly that is outside the design limits of the 21-PWR Absorber Plate waste package.
21-PWR Absorber Plate waste package Selection Error Calculation 
Section 6.3.1 Sensitivity Calculations
linterp PWP
1〈 〉 P1BWWP 0
〈 〉, 0.95,  2.298 10 1−×=95th percentile: 
linterp PWP
1〈 〉 P1BWWP 0
〈 〉, 0.5,  4.781 10 2−×=50th percentile: 
linterp PWP
1〈 〉 P1BWWP 0
〈 〉, 0.05,  9.164 10 3−×=5th percentile: 
mean probabilityµ1BWWP 7.415 10
2−×=µ1BWWP
1
ns 0
ns 1−
i
GBWi 0,∑=⋅:=
At least One, 44-BWR Absorber Plate waste package is misloaded
Estimate the mean probability and percentiles of a 21-PWR Absorber Plate waste package 
being misloaded (i.e., a fuel assembly outside its design limit loaded into the waste package).
P1BWWP sort GBW
0〈 〉 :=
Set up individual results to determine the mean and uncertainty parameters
The probability of at least one WP being misloaded is equal to 1 minus the 
probability of  zero waste packages misloaded.
GBWj 0, 1 BBWj 0,−:=
Probability of exactly 0 waste packages misloadedBBWj 0, dbinom k0 n44BW, YBWj 0,, :=
The probability calculation follows the binomial process.
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linterp PWP
1〈 〉 P1ABSWP 0
〈 〉, 0.95,  8.616 10 2−×=95th percentile: 
linterp PWP
1〈 〉 P1ABSWP 0
〈 〉, 0.5,  2.283 10 2−×=50th percentile: 
linterp PWP
1〈 〉 P1ABSWP 0
〈 〉, 0.05,  5.907 10 3−×=5th percentile: 
mean probabilityµ1ABSWP 3.15 10
2−×=µ1ABSWP
1
ns 0
ns 1−
i
GABSi 0,∑=⋅:=
At least One, 21-PWR Absorber Plate waste package is misloaded
Estimate the mean probability and percentiles of a 21-PWR Absorber Plate waste package 
being misloaded (i.e., a fuel assembly outside its design limit loaded into the waste package).
P1ABSWP sort GABS
0〈 〉 :=
Set up individual results to determine the mean and uncertainty parameters
The probability of at least one WP being misloaded is equal to 1 minus the 
probability of  zero waste packages misloaded.
GABSj 0, 1 BABSj 0,−:=
Probability of exactly 0 waste packages misloadedBABSj 0, dbinom k0 n21ABS, YABSj 0,, :=
The probability calculation follows the binomial process.
Calculate the probability of at least one waste package (i.e., one or more) allowing the epistemic 
uncertainty of the misload probability.
sample from the lognormal distribution to obtain a 
misload probability
YABSj 0, qlnorm Xj 0, λABS, ζABS,( ):=
ζABS
ln EFABS( )
1.645
:=λABS ln ABSλ1( ):=
Required parameters for the lognormal distribution.
EFABS 3.9=EFABS
ABSnfth
ABSfth
:=
To obtain the required parameters for a lognormal distribution, the 5th and 95th are used to calculate
the error factor for the lognormal distribution.
Commercial Spent Nuclear Fuel Waste Package Misload Analysis  
 
CAL-WHS-MD-000003 REV 00A III-10 September 2003 
 
Estimate the mean probability and percentiles of a 21-PWR Control Rod waste package being 
misloaded (i.e., a fuel assembly outside its design limit loaded into the waste package).
P1CRSWP sort GCRS
0〈 〉 :=
Set up individual results to determine the mean and uncertainty parameters
The probability of at least one WP being misloaded is equal to 1 minus the 
probability of  zero waste packages misloaded.
GCRSj 0, 1 BCRSj 0,−:=
Probability of exactly 0 waste packages misloadedBCRSj 0, dbinom k0 n21CR, YCRSj 0,, :=
The probability calculation follows the binomial process.
Calculate the probability of at least one waste package (i.e., one or more) allowing the epistemic 
uncertainty of the misload probability.
sample from the lognormal distribution to obtain a 
misload probability
YCRSj 0, qlnorm Xj 0, λCRS, ζCRS,( ):=
ζCRS
ln EFCRS( )
1.645
:=λCRS ln CRSλ1( ):=
Required parameters for the lognormal distribution.
EFCRS 33.24=EFCRS
CRSnfth
CRSfth
:=
To obtain the required parameters for a lognormal distribution, the 5th and 95th are used to calculate
the error factor for the lognormal distribution.
The results are fit to a lognormal distribution (Swain and Guttmann 1983, pp. A-2 and A-4).
CRSnfth 4.95 10
6−×:=CRSftth 1.57 10 7−×:=CRSfth 4.48 10 9−×:=CRSλ1 1.35 10 6−×:=
95th 50th 5thmean  
The mean, 5th,  50th, and 95th probability from analyzing the PWR misload event tree (21-PWR Control 
Rod).
Calculate the uncertainty of misloading at least one Waste Package (i.e., one or more) with a fuel
assembly that is outside the design limits of the 21-PWR Control Rod waste package.
21-PWR Control Rod waste package Selection Error Calculation 
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BWSλ1 7.03 10 6−×:= BWSfth 1.38 10 6−×:= BWSftth 5.00 10 6−×:= BWSnfth 1.88 10 5−×:=
The results are fit to a lognormal distribution (Swain and Guttmann 1983, pp. A-2 and A-4).
To obtain the required parameters for a lognormal distribution, the 5th and 95th are used to calculate
the error factor for the lognormal distribution.
EFBWS
BWSnfth
BWSfth
:= EFBWS 3.691=
Required parameters for the lognormal distribution.
λBWS ln BWSλ1( ):= ζBWS
ln EFBWS( )
1.645
:=
YBWSj 0, qlnorm Xj 0, λBWS, ζBWS,( ):= sample from the lognormal distribution to obtain a misload probability
Calculate the probability of at least one waste package (i.e., one or more) allowing the epistemic 
uncertainty of the misload probability.
The probability calculation follows the binomial process.
BBWSj 0, dbinom k0 n44BW, YBWSj 0,, := Probability of exactly 0 waste packages misloaded
At least One, 21-PWR Control Rod waste package is misloaded
µ1CRSWP
1
ns 0
ns 1−
i
GCRSi 0,∑=⋅:= µ1CRSWP 1.2 10
3−×= mean probability
5th percentile: linterp PWP
1〈 〉 P1CRSWP 0
〈 〉, 0.05,  3.867 10 6−×=
50th percentile: linterp PWP
1〈 〉 P1CRSWP 0
〈 〉, 0.5,  1.283 10 4−×=
95th percentile: linterp PWP
1〈 〉 P1CRSWP 0
〈 〉, 0.95,  4.261 10 3−×=
44-BWR Absorber Plate waste package Selection Error Calculation 
Calculate the uncertainty of misloading at least one Waste Package (i.e., one or more) with a fuel
assembly that is outside the design limits of the 44-BWR Absorber Plate waste package.
The mean, 5th, 50th, and 95th probability from analyzing the BWR misload event tree (44-BWR).
mean  5th 50th 95th 
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EFABs 5.202=EFABs
ABsnfth
ABsfth
:=
To obtain the required parameters for a lognormal distribution, the 5th and 95th are used to calculate
the error factor for the lognormal distribution.
The results were fit to a lognormal distribution (Swain and Guttmann 1983, pp. A-2 and A-4).
ABsnfth 3.68 10
5−×:=ABsftth 7.05 10 6−×:=ABsfth 1.36 10 6−×:=ABsλ1 1.18 10 5−×:=
95th 50th 5thmean  
The mean, 5th,  50th, and 95th probability from analyzing the PWR misload event tree (21-PWR Absorber 
Plate).
Calculate the uncertainty of misloading at least one Waste Package (i.e., one or more) with a fuel
assembly that is outside the design limits of the waste package.
21-PWR Absorber Plate waste package (all PWR waste packages 
contain absorber plate) Calculation 
Section 6.3.2 Sensitivity Calculations
linterp PWP
1〈 〉 P1BWSWP 0
〈 〉, 0.95,  7.087 10 2−×=95th percentile: 
linterp PWP
1〈 〉 P1BWSWP 0
〈 〉, 0.5,  1.971 10 2−×=50th percentile: 
linterp PWP
1〈 〉 P1BWSWP 0
〈 〉, 0.05,  5.382 10 3−×=5th percentile: 
mean probabilityµ1BWSWP 2.66 10
2−×=µ1BWSWP
1
ns 0
ns 1−
i
GBWSi 0,∑=⋅:=
At least One, 44-BWR Absorber Plate waste package is misloaded
Estimate the mean probability and percentiles of a 44-BWR Absorber Plate waste package 
being misloaded (i.e., a fuel assembly outside its design limit loaded into the waste package).
P1BWSWP sort GBWS
0〈 〉 :=
Set up individual results to determine the mean and uncertainty parameters
The probability of at least one WP being misloaded is equal to 1 minus the 
probability of  zero waste packages misloaded.
GBWSj 0, 1 BBWSj 0,−:=
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linterp PWP
1〈 〉 P1ABsWP 0
〈 〉, 0.95,  2.321 10 1−×=95th percentile: 
linterp PWP
1〈 〉 P1ABsWP 0
〈 〉, 0.5,  4.948 10 2−×=50th percentile: 
linterp PWP
1〈 〉 P1ABsWP 0
〈 〉, 0.05,  9.715 10 3−×=5th percentile: 
mean probabilityµ1ABsWP 7.573 10
2−×=µ1ABsWP
1
ns 0
ns 1−
i
GABsi 0,∑=⋅:=
At least One, 21-PWR Absorber Plate waste package is misloaded
Estimate the mean probability and percentiles of a 21-PWR Absorber Plate waste package 
being misloaded (i.e., a fuel assembly outside its design limit loaded into the waste package).
P1ABsWP sort GABs
0〈 〉 :=
Set up individual results to determine the mean and uncertainty parameters
The probability of at least one WP being misloaded is equal to 1 minus the 
probability of  zero waste packages misloaded.
GABs j 0, 1 BABs j 0,−:=
Probability of exactly 0 waste packages misloadedBABs j 0, dbinom k0 n21ABS, YABs j 0,, :=
The probability calculation follows the binomial process.
Calculate the probability of at least one waste package (i.e., one or more) allowing the epistemic 
uncertainty of the misload probability.
sample from the lognormal distribution to obtain a 
misload probability
YABs j 0, qlnorm Xj 0, λABs, ζABs,( ):=
ζABs
ln EFABs( )
1.645
:=λABs ln ABsλ1( ):=
Required parameters for the lognormal distribution.
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Estimate the mean probability and percentiles of a 21-PWR Control Rod waste package being 
misloaded (i.e., a fuel assembly outside its design limit loaded into the waste package).
P1CRsWP sort GCRs
0〈 〉 :=
Set up individual results to determine the mean and uncertainty parameters
The probability of at least one WP being misloaded is equal to 1 minus the 
probability of  zero waste packages misloaded.
GCRsj 0, 1 BCRsj 0,−:=
Probability of exactly 0 waste packages misloadedBCRsj 0, dbinom k0 n21CR, YCRsj 0,, :=
The probability calculation follows the binomial process.
Calculate the probability of at least one waste package (i.e., one or more) allowing the epistemic 
uncertainty of the misload probability.
sample from the lognormal distribution to obtain a 
misload probability
YCRsj 0, qlnorm Xj 0, λCRs, ζCRs,( ):=
ζCRs
ln EFCRs( )
1.645
:=λCRs ln CRsλ1( ):=
Required parameters for the lognormal distribution.
EFCRs 42.84=EFCRs
CRsnfth
CRsfth
:=
To obtain the required parameters for a lognormal distribution, the 5th and 95th are used to calculate
the error factor for the lognormal distribution.
The results are fit to a lognormal distribution (Swain and Guttmann 1983, pp. A-2 and A-4).
CRsnfth 3.12 10
9−×:=CRsftth 7.22 10 11−×:=CRsfth 1.70 10 12−×:=CRsλ1 9.39 10 10−×:=
95th 50th 5thmean  
The mean, 5th,  50th, and 95th probability from analyzing the PWR misload event tree (21-PWR Control 
Rod).
Calculate the uncertainty of misloading at least one Waste Package (i.e., one or more) with a fuel
assembly that is outside the design limits of the 21-PWR Control Rod waste package.
21-PWR Control Rod waste package (all PWR waste packages 
contain absorber plate) Calculation 
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Calculate the probability of at least one waste package (i.e., one or more) allowing the epistemic 
uncertainty of the misload probability.
sample from the lognormal distribution to obtain a 
misload probability
YABLj 0, qlnorm Xj 0, λABL, ζABL,( ):=
ζABL
ln EFABL( )
1.645
:=λABL ln ABLλ1( ):=
Required parameters for the lognormal distribution.
EFABL 6.642=EFABL
ABLnfth
ABLfth
:=
To obtain the required parameters for a lognormal distribution, the 5th and 95th are used to calculate
the error factor for the lognormal distribution.
The results were fit to a lognormal distribution (Swain and Guttmann 1983, pp. A-2 and A-4).
ABLnfth 1.20 10
5−×:=ABLftth 1.90 10 6−×:=ABLfth 2.72 10 7−×:=ABLλ1 3.52 10 6−×:=
95th 50th 5thmean  
The mean, 5th,  50th, and 95th probability from analyzing the PWR misload event tree (21-PWR Absorber 
Plate).
Calculate the uncertainty of misloading at least one Waste Package (i.e., one or more) with a fuel
assembly that is outside the design limits of the waste package.
21-PWR Absorber Plate waste package (Loading Schema) Calculation
Section 6.3.3 Sensitivity Calculations
linterp PWP
1〈 〉 P1CRsWP 0
〈 〉, 0.95,  3.829 10 6−×=95th percentile:  
linterp PWP
1〈 〉 P1CRsWP 0
〈 〉, 0.5,  8.926 10 8−×=50th percentile: 
linterp PWP
1〈 〉 P1CRsWP 0
〈 〉, 0.05,  2.087 10 9−×=5th percentile: 
mean probabilityµ1CRsWP 1.211 10
6−×=µ1CRsWP
1
ns 0
ns 1−
i
GCRsi 0,∑=⋅:=
At least One, 21-PWR Control Rod waste package is misloaded
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The results are fit to a lognormal distribution (Swain and Guttmann 1983, pp. A-2 and A-4).
CRLnfth 5.35 10
6−×:=CRLftth 1.59 10 7−×:=CRLfth 4.93 10 9−×:=CRLλ1 1.43 10 6−×:=
95th 50th 5thmean  
The mean, 5th,  50th, and 95th probability from analyzing the PWR misload event tree (21-PWR Control 
Rod).
Calculate the uncertainty of misloading at least one Waste Package (i.e., one or more) with a fuel
assembly that is outside the design limits of the 21-PWR Control Rod waste package.
21-PWR Control Rod waste package (Loading Schema) Calculation 
linterp PWP
1〈 〉 P1ABLWP 0
〈 〉, 0.95,  9.571 10 2−×=95th percentile: 
linterp PWP
1〈 〉 P1ABLWP 0
〈 〉, 0.5,  1.502 10 2−×=50th percentile: 
linterp PWP
1〈 〉 P1ABLWP 0
〈 〉, 0.05,  2.279 10 3−×=5th percentile: 
mean probabilityµ1ABLWP 2.791 10
2−×=µ1ABLWP
1
ns 0
ns 1−
i
GABLi 0,∑=⋅:=
At least One, 21-PWR Absorber Plate waste package is misloaded
Estimate the mean probability and percentiles of a 21-PWR Absorber Plate waste package 
being misloaded (i.e., a fuel assembly outside its design limit loaded into the waste package).
P1ABLWP sort GABL
0〈 〉 :=
Set up individual results to determine the mean and uncertainty parameters
GABLj 0, 1 BABLj 0,−:=
The probability of at least one WP being misloaded is equal to 1 minus the 
probability of  zero waste packages misloaded.
Probability of exactly 0 waste packages misloadedBABLj 0, dbinom k0 n21ABS, YABLj 0,, :=
The probability calculation follows the binomial process.
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linterp PWP
1〈 〉 P1CRLWP 0
〈 〉, 0.95,  4.473 10 3−×=95th percentile: 
linterp PWP
1〈 〉 P1CRLWP 0
〈 〉, 0.5,  1.359 10 4−×=50th percentile: 
linterp PWP
1〈 〉 P1CRLWP 0
〈 〉, 0.05,  4.133 10 6−×=5th percentile: 
mean probabilityµ1CRLWP 1.255 10
3−×=µ1CRLWP
1
ns 0
ns 1−
i
GCRLi 0,∑=⋅:=
At least One, 21-PWR Control Rod waste package is misloaded
Estimate the mean probability and percentiles of a 21-PWR Control Rod waste package being 
misloaded (i.e., a fuel assembly outside its design limit loaded into the waste package).
P1CRLWP sort GCRL
0〈 〉 :=
Set up individual results to determine the mean and uncertainty parameters
The probability of at least one WP being misloaded is equal to 1 minus the 
probability of  zero waste packages misloaded.
GCRLj 0, 1 BCRLj 0,−:=
Probability of exactly 0 waste packages misloadedBCRLj 0, dbinom k0 n21CR, YCRLj 0,, :=
The probability calculation follows the binomial process.
Calculate the probability of at least one waste package (i.e., one or more) allowing the epistemic 
uncertainty of the misload probability.
sample from the lognormal distribution to obtain a 
misload probability
YCRLj 0, qlnorm Xj 0, λCRL, ζCRL,( ):=
ζCRL
ln EFCRL( )
1.645
:=λCRL ln CRLλ1( ):=
Required parameters for the lognormal distribution.
EFCRL 32.942=EFCRL
CRLnfth
CRLfth
:=
To obtain the required parameters for a lognormal distribution, the 5th and 95th are used to calculate
the error factor for the lognormal distribution.
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Estimate the mean probability and percentiles of a 21-PWR Absorber Plate waste package 
being misloaded (i.e., a fuel assembly outside its design limit loaded into the waste package).
P1ABOWP sort GABO
0〈 〉 :=
Set up individual results to determine the mean and uncertainty parameters
The probability of at least one WP being misloaded is equal to 1 minus the 
probability of  zero waste packages misloaded.
GABOj 0, 1 BABOj 0,−:=
Probability of exactly 0 waste packages misloadedBABOj 0, dbinom k0 n21ABS, YABOj 0,, :=
The probability calculation follows the binomial process.
Calculate the probability of at least one waste package (i.e., one or more) allowing the epistemic 
uncertainty of the misload probability.
sample from the lognormal distribution to obtain a 
misload probability
YABOj 0, qlnorm Xj 0, λABO, ζABO,( ):=
ζABO
ln EFABO( )
1.645
:=λABO ln ABOλ1( ):=
Required parameters for the lognormal distribution.
EFABO 6.642=EFABO
ABOnfth
ABOfth
:=
To obtain the required parameters for a lognormal distribution, the 5th and 95th are used to calculate
the error factor for the lognormal distribution.
The results were fit to a lognormal distribution (Swain and Guttmann 1983, pp. A-2 and A-4).
ABOnfth 1.20 10
5−×:=ABOftth 1.90 10 6−×:=ABOfth 2.72 10 7−×:=ABOλ1 3.52 10 6−×:=
95th 50th 5thmean 
The mean, 5th,  50th, and 95th probability from analyzing the PWR misload event tree (21-PWR Absorber 
Plate).
Calculate the uncertainty of misloading at least one Waste Package (i.e., one or more) with a fuel
assembly that is outside the design limits of the waste package.
21-PWR Absorber Plate waste package (Sequence 3)  Calculation
Section 6.3.4 Sensitivity Calculations
Commercial Spent Nuclear Fuel Waste Package Misload Analysis  
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At least One, 21-PWR Absorber Plate waste package is misloaded
µ1ABOWP
1
ns 0
ns 1−
i
GABOi 0,∑=⋅:= µ1ABOWP 2.791 10
2−×= mean probability
5th percentile: linterp PWP
1〈 〉 P1ABOWP 0
〈 〉, 0.05,  2.279 10 3−×=
50th percentile: linterp PWP
1〈 〉 P1ABOWP 0
〈 〉, 0.5,  1.502 10 2−×=
95th percentile:  linterp PWP
1〈 〉 P1ABOWP 0
〈 〉, 0.95,  9.571 10 2−×=
